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Abstract: Many security properties are naturally expressed as indistinguishability between two
versions of a protocol. In this paper, we show that computational proofs of indistinguishability
can be considerably simplified, for a class of processes that covers most existing protocols. More
precisely, we show a soundness theorem, following the line of research launched by Abadi and
Rogaway in 2000: computational indistinguishability in presence of an active attacker is implied
by the observational equivalence of the corresponding symbolic processes.
Up to our knowledge, the only result of this kind is Ada˜o and Fournet [7], in which, however,
cryptographic primitives are not part of the syntax. Otherwise, previous works either considered
a passive attacker, or, in case of active attackers, proved a soundness result for properties that can
be defined on execution traces of the protocol. Anonymity for instance does not fall in the latter
category.
We prove our result for symmetric encryption, but the same techniques can be applied to other se-
curity primitives such as signatures and public-key encryption. The proof requires the introduction
of new concepts, which are general and can be reused in other settings.
Key-words: computational soundness, cryptographic protocols, verification, communicating
processes
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Correction calculatoire de l’e´quivalence observationelle
Re´sume´ : De nombreuses proprie´te´s de se´curite´ s’expriment naturellement comme l’indistingabilite´
(c’est-a`-dire l’impossibilite´ de distinguer) deux versions d’un protocole. Dans ce document, nous
montrons que les preuves calculatoires de l’indistingabilite´ peuvent eˆtre conside´rablement sim-
plifie´es, pour une classe de processus qui couvrent la plupart des protocoles existants. Plus
pre´cise´ment, nous prouvons un the´ore`me de correction - dans la ligne´e des travaux inite´s par
Abadi et Rogaway en 2000: l’indistingabilite´ calculatoire en pre´sence d’un intrus actif est assure´e
par l’e´quivalence observationelle des processus symboliques correspondants.
A` notre connaissance, le seul re´sultat de cette sorte est celui de Ada˜o et Fournet [7]. Cependant,
dans cet article, la syntaxe ne comprend pas de primitives cryptographiques. En dehors de ce
re´sultat, les travaux existants conside`rent un attaquant passif ou, dans le cas d’attaquants actifs,
obtiennent des re´sultats de correction pour des proprie´te´s qui peuvent eˆtre de´finies sur les traces
d’exe´cution d’un protocole; ce qui n’est pas le cas de l’anonymat par exemple.
Nous prouvons notre re´sultat pour le chiffrement asyme´trique mais les meˆmes techniques pour-
raient eˆtre applique´es aux autres primitives de se´curite´ telles que la signature ou le chiffrement
a` clef publique. Les techniques de preuves ont demande´ l’introduction de nouveaux concepts
ge´ne´raux qui pourront eˆtre re´utilise´s dans d’autres contextes.
Mots-cle´s : correction calculatoire, protocoles cryptographiques, ve´rification, processus com-
municants
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1 Introduction
Two families of models have been designed for the rigorous analysis of security protocols: the
so-called Dolev-Yao (symbolic, formal) models on the one hand and the cryptographic (computa-
tional, concrete) models on the other hand. In symbolic models messages are formal terms and
the adversary can only perform a fixed set of operations on them. The main advantage of the
symbolic approach is its relative simplicity which makes it amenable to automated analysis tools
(see, e.g., [17, 8]). In cryptographic models, messages are bit strings and the adversary is an
arbitrary probabilistic polynomial-time (ppt) Turing machine. While the proofs in such models
yield strong security guarantees, they are often quite involved and seldom suitable for automation.
Starting with the seminal work of Abadi and Rogaway [5], a lot of efforts has been directed to
bridging the gap between the two approaches. The goal is to obtain the best of both worlds: simple,
automated security proofs that entail strong security guarantees. The numerous relevant works
can be divided into two categories. In the first one ([1, 15, 35] and many others), the authors
generalize Abadi and Rogaway result, typically considering a larger set of security primitives.
However, they still only consider a passive adversary. This rules out the so-called “man-in-the-
middle attacks”. Analyzing real protocols requires to consider active adversaries, which is the aim
of the second category of papers (e.g. [10, 21, 24, 34]). It is also the aim of the present paper. We
consider however a wider class of security properties.
Trace properties vs. Equivalence properties. We call here a trace property a formal state-
ment that something bad never occurs on any trace of a protocol. (Formally, this is a property
definable in linear time temporal logic). Integrity and authentication are examples of trace prop-
erties. That is why they were the first for which computational guarantees were derived out of
symbolic ones [12, 36].
There are however several security properties, which cannot be defined (or cannot be naturally
defined) as trace properties. We give now some examples, both in the computational and in the
symbolic worlds.
  Anonymity states that any two execution traces, in which names are swapped, cannot be dis-
tinguished by an attacker. More precisely, anonymity requires two instances of the protocol
PAB and PBA, the names A,B being switched in the second copy. An adversary interacting
with one of the two copies should not be able to tell (with non-negligible probability) with
which copy he is interacting. There is no known way to reduce this problem to a property
of a single protocol copy.
Privacy related properties involved in electronic voting protocols [25] also use an equivalence
and cannot be expressed in linear temporal logic.
  Similarly, in the computational worlds, anonymity of group signatures [6] is defined through
the indistinguishability of two games where different identities are used in each game. A
similar definition is proposed for “blindness” of signatures in [31]. More details will be
provided in the core of the paper.
  The “computational secrecy” states that the protocol does not leak any piece of the secret
(this is sometimes called “real or random”). Such a property is naturally expressed as an
indistinguishability property: the attacker cannot distinguish between two games, one of
which is the real protocol, and, in the other one, the secret has been replaced by a random
string. There are several works [36, 11, 24, 28, 21, 23, 30] showing how to soundly abstract
it as a trace property in the symbolic model, in a number of particular cases. It is not clear,
however, that such a property can be expressed as a trace property in general. Consider e.g.
the case of a hash function and assume that a protocol reveals the hash h(s) of some secret s.
Then s cannot be computed (by one-wayness of h), which, from the trace property point of
view, would be sufficient for confidentiality. On the other hand, an attacker certainly learns
something about s and the computational secrecy is not preserved.
RR n

6508
4 H. Comon-Lundh & V. Cortier
  Strong (also called “black-box”) simulatability [13, 33], states that, given a real protocol P
and an ideal functionality F , there is a simulator S such that P cannot be distinguished
from S‖F by any environment. Again, this is not a property of any particular trace, but
rather a relationship between the real traces and the ideal ones. Various notions of universal
composability [20, 22] can be defined in a similar way.
This shows the importance and generality of indistinguishability properties compared to trace
properties.
The main question is then: “is it possible to get sound abstraction results for computational
indistinguishability, analogous to the results obtained so far for trace properties ?” This is the
question, which we want to address in this paper, for a sample set of cryptographic primitives.
Our contribution. There is a well-known similar notion in concurrency theory: observational
equivalence, introduced by Milner and Hoare in the early 80s. Two processes P and Q are obser-
vationally equivalent, denoted by P ∼o Q, if for any process O (a symbolic observer) the processes
P‖O and Q‖O are equally able to emit on a given channel. This means that O cannot observe
any difference between P and Q. Observational equivalence is therefore a natural candidate for
the symbolic counterpart of indistinguishability, the attacker being replaced by the observer. And
indeed, we show in this paper a result of the form “two networks of machines are indistinguishable
if the processes they implement are observationally equivalent”. As a consequence, proving com-
putational indistinguishability can be reduced to proving observational equivalence (for a class of
protocols and assuming some standard security hypotheses on the cryptographic primitives). This
is a simpler task, which can be completely formalized and sometimes automated [18, 26].
We prove our result for symmetric encryption and pairing, using a fragment of the applied pi-
calculus [3] for specifying protocols and relying on standard cryptographic assumptions (IND-CPA
and INT-CTXT) as well as hypotheses, which are similar to those of [10]. The main difference
with this latter work is that we prove the soundness of observational equivalence, which covers
more properties. The fragment of applied pi-calculus we consider allows to express an arbitrary
(unbounded) number of sessions of a protocol.
To prove our result, we need first to show that any computational trace is, with overwhelming
probability, an instance of a symbolic one. This lemma is similar to [24, 28], though with different
hypotheses and in a different model. A naive idea would be then to consider any pair of related
symbolic traces: by observational equivalence (and actually labeled bisimilarity) the two traces
are statically equivalent. Then we could try to apply soundness of static equivalence on these
traces (using results in the passive case, e.g. [5, 1, 15, 35]). This idea does not work, since the
computational traces could be spread over the symbolic ones: if there is only one computational
trace corresponding to a given symbolic trace, then the symbolic traces indistinguishability does
not tell us anything relevant on the computational ones.
That is why we need a new tool; the main technical ingredient of our proof is the introduction
of tree soundness in the case of passive attackers and the use of intermediate structures, which
we called computation trees : on one end such trees roughly correspond to the labeled transition
semantics of some process algebra, and, on the other end, they are interpreted as an encryption
oracle, scheduled by the attacker. These notions are defined independently of the cryptographic
setting. Tree soundness captures the fact that even a passive attacker can adaptively choose its
requests. It seems related to “adaptive soundness of static equivalence” as defined in [32] though no
precise relationship has been established yet. We can then derive a general method for proving that
observational equivalence implies computational indistinguishability. We believe our techniques
are general and can be reused in other settings. In particular, using our generic approach, it should
not be difficult to extend our result to other security primitives like asymmetric encryption and
signatures.
Related Work. In a series of papers starting with Micciancio and Warinschi [36] and continued
with e.g. [24, 28], the authors show trace mapping properties: for some selected primitives (public-
key encryption and signatures in the above-cited papers) they show that a computational trace
INRIA
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is an instance of a symbolic trace, with overwhelming probability. We have a similar result for
symmetric encryption in the present paper, but this is not our main contribution: this is only a
step towards the lifting of indistinguishability.
There is a huge amount of work on simulatability/universal composability, especially the work
of Backes et. al. and Canetti [20, 13, 12, 10, 11]. When the ideal functionality is the symbolic
version of the protocol, then the black-box simulatability implies the trace mapping property [9],
therefore showing a safe abstraction. But, again, this does not show that (and how) indistin-
guishability properties can be soundly abstracted.
Simulatability itself (this time, not necessarily with an ideal functionality, which is given by the
symbolic protocol), given a simulator, is an indistinguishability property. So, our result could help
simplifying and maybe automating simulatability proofs, provided the simulator is given. Indeed,
thanks to our result, it is now possible to prove simulatability in the symbolic setting.
Our work can also be seen as a generalization of soundness results for static equivalence [5, 14,
15] from a passive attacker to an active one. However, as we sketched above and as we will see
on an example later, these results cannot be used directly in the active attacker case, which is the
one we consider.
In [21] the authors show how to encode an equivalence property (actually computational secrecy
for a given set of primitives) in the symbolic trace, using patterns. This allows to show how an
indistinguishability property can be lifted to the symbolic case. The method, contrary to ours, is
however dedicated to this particular property.
The work of Mitchell et. al. [37] also aims at faithfully abstracting the model of interactive
Turing machines. Their results concern general processes and not only a small fragment, as we
do here. In this respect, they are much more general than us. However, on the other hand, they
abstract much less: there are still computations, coin tossing and probabilistic transitions in their
model. Our aim is really to show that it makes no difference if the attacker is given only a fixed set
of operations (encryption, decryption, name generation...) and if there is no probabilities nor coin
tossing. In the present paper, we start from a simple model of communicating Turing machines,
but we could have started from a higher-level language such as the probabilistic process algebras
of [37], without changing the core of our contribution.
To our knowledge, the only previous work formally connecting observational equivalence and
computational indistinguishability is [7]. In this paper, the authors give soundness and complete-
ness results of a cryptographic implementation of processes. The major difference with our work
is that they do not have explicit cryptographic constructions in the formal model. For instance
encryption keys cannot be sent or leaked since they are implicit. Most standard security protocols
cannot be described at this level of abstraction without possibly missing attacks. The results of [7]
are useful in designing secure implementations of abstract functionalities, not for the verification
of existing protocols.
Finally, the work on automation and decision of static equivalence [2] and observational equiv-
alence [27, 18, 26] is related to our work, as it shows that there exist systematic ways of deriving
such equivalences in the symbolic world.
Organization of the paper. We first give the definitions of our computational model in section
2. Next we recall some of the general definitions of applied pi-calculus in section 3. Note that, in
the following, we only consider a fragment of the calculus for the protocol description (as usual),
and we will only consider a particular equational theory corresponding to symmetric encryption.
The relationship between the two models, as well as the protocol description language is given in
section 4. In section 5 we give our main result and outline the proof. The notions of computation
trees, tree oracles, tree soundness are introduced in section 6. Intermediate lemmas and full proofs
are provided in section 7.
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2 Communicating Turing machines
Randomized Turing machines are Turing machines with an additional random tape. We assume
w.l.o.g. that these machine first draw an infinite random input string on the random tape, and then
compute deterministically. Communicating Turing machines are randomized machines equipped
with input/output tapes and two special instructions: send and receive. They are restricted to
work in polynomial time with respect to their original input (see [13, 33] for a discussion). As
in [13], we assume that, for each machine M , there is a polynomial PM such that the number of
computation steps of M is bounded by PM (η) where η is the length of the initial input of M . So, in
our framework, a communicating Turing machine is actually a pair of a machine and a polynomial
and, in an initialization phase, the machine will compute PM (η). In further computations M
will subtract 1 from the result after each computation step (not including the very substraction
operation, of course). When the machine reaches the computation bounds, it simply performs
a fixed number of moves, typically writing an error message on the output tape, and stops. In
order to keep light notations, we will abstract out this, essential but straightforward, issue in the
following and forget about the polynomial PM . Randomized machines equipped with such a time
complexity control device will be called PPT.
Definition 1 A communicating Turing machine (CTM) is a PPT, equipped with two additional
tapes. One is the sending tape and is write only and the other is the receiving tape and is read
only. The machine has two special instructions: receive and send.
We assume that there are two final states: an accepting one and a failure one (written ⊥) and
that final states can only be reached after a send action and that there is no deadlock, except in
final states.
The final assumptions are not restrictions as the machines can always be completed in order
to fulfill these additional requirements.
Definition 2 The adversary is a PPT with three additional working tapes: a reading tape (TR), a
writing tape (TW ) and a scheduling tape (TS) The adversary has three additional instructions: new,
send and receive. A network F‖A consists of an adversary A and a family of CTMs F = (Mn)n∈N.
Each machine Mn has a type, which is a positive integer. We also call F the environment of A.
This model is a simplification of interactive Turing machines of [20], keeping only the essential
features. The type of a machine represents the program implemented by the machine. For instance,
protocols are usually described as parallel a composition of finitely many roles, each of which is a
reactive program executed on a single machine. In this case, the type of the machine is the role,
which is implemented by the machine.
In the initial configuration, each machine of the network has the security parameter in unary
on its input tape and possibly other data on their input tapes such as secret keys. For simplicity
we do not model here the key distribution. Moves between configurations are defined according
to the attacker’s view: in each configuration, the attacker decides to perform an internal move,
to ask for the initialization of a new machine or to schedule a communication. In the latter case,
the identity of the recipient is written on the scheduling tape and either a send or a receive action
is performed. In case of a send, the contents of the sending tape is copied to the receiving tape
of the scheduled recipient, who performs (in one single step) all its computations, until (s)he is
waiting for another communication. In case of a receive action, the whole content of the sending
tape of the scheduled machine is copied on the receiving tape of the attacker. More formally:
Definition 3 A configuration of the network consists in
1. a local configuration γn for each machine Mn
2. a local configuration γ of the adversary
3. a list of active machines lam: this is a list of triples (n, j, p) where n is a machine number,
j a machine type and p ∈ N a pid.
INRIA
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Given a configuration ({γn}n∈N, γ, lam) the network moves to the configuration ({γ ′n}n∈N, γ
′, l′am),
which is defined as follows:
  If the move of the adversary A does not involve any of its special actions new, send, receive,
then γ′n = γn for all n, lam = l
′
am and γ
′ is obtained by the move of A
  If A performs a receive action, p is the content of the scheduling tape of A
– if (i, j, p) ∈ lam, and Mi is ready to perform a send action and w is the content of the
sending tape of Mi, then γ
′
n = γn for all n 6= i, TR is set to w and the control is given
to Mi, which moves until it reaches a final state or is ready to perform a receive action
or a send action. This yields a configuration γ ′i of Mi, A moves to γ
′ and l′am = lam.
– Otherwise, γ′n = γn for all n, l
′
am = lam, TR is set to ⊥ and A moves to γ
′.
  If A performs a send action, p is the content of the scheduling tape of A and w is the content
of TW
– if (i, j, p) ∈ lam, and Mi is ready to perform a receive action, then γ ′n = γn for all n 6= i,
w is copied on the receiving tape of Mi and the control is passed to Mi, which moves
until it reaches a final state or is ready to perform a receive action or a send action.
This yields a configuration γ ′i of Mi, A moves to γ
′ and l′am = lam.
– Otherwise, γ′n = γn for all n, l
′
am = lam, TR is set to ⊥ and A moves to γ
′.
  if A performs a new action, and j is on the scheduling tape of A,
– if there is at least one machine Mn whose type is j and such that there is no triple
(n, j, x) ∈ lam, we let n be the minimal such index. Then, in the new configuration,
γ′n = γn for all n, TR is set to a pid p drawn (on the random tape), A moves to γ
′ and
l′am = lam ∪ {(n, j, p)}
– otherwise, TR is set to ⊥, lam and all γi are unchanged and A moves to γ ′.
The number of CTMs in the network is unbounded. Note that this setting does not allow
dynamically corrupted parties as in most results relating symbolic and computational models;
there is simply a type for corrupted parties playing a given role. Corrupted machines, in addition
to the expected program implementing the role, also send all their private data on the network.
There is no limitation in the messages size, which are inputs of the machines. However, because
of polynomial time restrictions, unexpectedly long messages cannot be read entirely anyway.
We say that a function f : N → N is negligible if, for every polynomial P , ∃N ∈ N, ∀η >
N, f(η) < 1
P (η) . We write Pr{x : P (x)} the probability of event P (x) when the sample x is drawn
according to an appropriate distribution (the key distribution or the uniform distribution; this is
kept implicit).
Two families of machines are indistinguishable if any adversary cannot tell with which family
he is connected with non negligible probability:
Definition 4 Two environments F and F ′ are indistinguishable, which we write F ≈ F ′, if, for
every attacker A,
|Pr{r, r : (F(r) ‖A(r))(0η) = 1} −Pr{r, r : (F ′(r) ‖A(r))(0η) = 1}|
is negligible. r is the sequence of random inputs of the machines in F (resp. F ′), including keys.
r is the random input of the attacker.
Example 2.1 As described in introduction, the computational secrecy of s can be expressed as
follows. In F0, the machines using s are set with s0 while in F1, they are set with s1. The
values s0 and s1 could also be chosen by the attacker. Then the data s is computationally secret
if F0 ≈ F1. Note that the environments Fb may contain corrupted machines, not holding si, that
start by leaking their private information to the adversary.
RR n
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Example 2.2 Anonymity of group signatures [6] is defined through the following game: the ad-
versary chooses a message m and two identities i0 and i1. Then in F0, the machines sign m with
identity i0 while in F1, the machines sign m with identity i1. Again the property is defined by
F0 ≈ F1.
Example 2.3 More generally, security properties can be defined by specifying the ideal behavior
Pideal of a protocol P and requiring that the two protocols are indistinguishable. For example, in [4],
authenticity is defined through the specification of a process where the party B magically received
the message sent by the party A. This process should be indistinguishable from the initial one.
3 The applied pi-calculus
We use the applied pi-calculus of [3] as a symbolic model. We recall the definitions in this sec-
tion. Note that we will only consider a small fragment of the applied-pi-calculus for the protocol
descriptions and only a particular equational theory for our main result.
3.1 Syntax
A signature is a finite set of function symbols with an arity. It represents the security primitives
(e.g. encryption, pairing, decryption). Given a signature Σ, an infinite set N of names and an
infinite set X of variables, T (N ,X ) is the set of terms, defined as follows:
s, t, u ::= terms
x, y, z variable
a, b, c, k, n, r name
f(s1, . . . , sk) function application
where f ∈ Σ and k is the arity of f .
We assume that Σ always contains a binary pairing function < u, v >, the corresponding
projections functions pi1, pi2 and constants newj for j ∈ N. We assume infinitely many names of
any length. Terms represent messages and names stand for (randomly) generated data. α, β, . . .
are meta-variables that range over names and variables. u stands for a sequence u1, . . . , un.
σ = {x1 7→ s1, . . . , xk 7→ sk} is the substitution that replaces the variable xi with the term si.
The domain of σ, denoted by dom(σ) is the set {x1, . . . , xk}.
Example 3.1 Σ0 is the signature consisting of the binary pairing < ·, · >, the two associated
projections pi1, pi2, the binary decryption dec and the ternary symbol {·}·· for symmetric encryption:
{x}rk stands for the encryption of x with the key k and the random r. Σ0 also contains constants
with in particular a constant 0l of length l for every l.
Terms are also (as usual) identified with ranked trees, i.e. mappings from a prefix closed set
of positions Pos(t) to labels. t(p) is then the label at position p and t|p is the subtree rooted at
position p.
Example 3.2 Let t = {<< k1, k1 >, k2 >}rk3 . Then Pos(t) = {, 1, 2, 3, 11, 12, 111, 112}, t() =
{·}··, t(3) = r, t(11) =< ·, · >, t(111) = k1. t|12 = k3, t|1 =<< k1, k1 >, k2 >.
The syntax of processes and extended processes is displayed in Figure 1. In what follows,
we restrict ourselves to processes with public channels, that is, there is no restriction on name
channel. We assume a set P of predicate symbols with an arity. Such a definition, as well as its
operational semantics coincides with [3], hence will not be recalled in details, except for one minor
point: we consider conditionals with arbitrary predicates. This leaves some flexibility in modeling
various levels of assumptions on the cryptographic primitives. Typical examples are the ability (or
not) to check whether a decryption succeeds, or the ability (or not) to check that two ciphertexts
are produced using the same encryption key. Other examples are typing predicates, which we
INRIA
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Φ1,Φ2 ::= conditions
p(s1, . . . , sn) predicate application
Φ1 ∧ Φ2 conjunction
P,Q,R ::= processes
c(x).P input
c(s).P output
0 terminated process
P ‖Q parallel composition
!P replication
(να)P restriction
if Φ then P else Q conditional
A,B,C ::= extended processes
P plain process
A‖B parallel composition
(να)A restriction
{x 7→ s} active substitution
Figure 1: Syntax of processes
may want (or not). In [3] the condition is always an equality. Encoding the predicate semantics
with equalities is often possible, at least when there is no negative condition: it suffices then to
express when a predicate is true. It is however not possible in general to express equationally the
truth and falsity of a predicate. We believe that predicates allow to better reflect the ability of
the adversary, with less coding.
In the paper, we often confuse “process” an “extended process” (and do not follow the lexico-
graphic convention A,B... vs P.Q, ...).
3.2 Operational semantics
We briefly recall the operational semantics of the applied pi-calculus (see [3] for details). E is a
set of equations on the signature Σ, defining an equivalence relation =E on T (N ), which is closed
under context. =E is meant to capture several representations of the same message. This yields
a quotient algebra T (N )/ =E , representing the messages. and under substitutions of terms for
variables.
Predicate symbols are interpreted as relations over T (N )/ =E . This yields a structureM.
Example 3.3 The equations E0 corresponding to Σ0 are
dec({x}zy, y) = x pi1(< x, y >) = x pi2(< x, y >) = y
They can be oriented, yielding a convergent rewrite system: every term s has a unique normal
form s ↓. We may also consider the following predicates:
  M is unary and holds on a (ground) term s iff s ↓ does not contain any projection nor
decryption symbols and for any {u}rv subterm of s, v and r must be names. This forbids
compound keys for instance.
  EQ is binary and holds on s, t iff M(s),M(t) and s ↓= t ↓: this is a strict interpretation of
equality.
  Psamekey is binary and holds on ciphertexts using the same encryption key: M |= Psamekey(s, t)
iff ∃k, u, v, r, r′.EQ(s, {u}rk) ∧ EQ(t, {v}
r′
k ).
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A ‖ 0 ≡ A
A ‖B ≡ B ‖A
(A ‖B) ‖ C ≡ A ‖ (B ‖C)
(να)(νβ)A ≡ (νβ)(να)A
(να)(A ‖B) ≡ A ‖ (να)B if α /∈ fn(A) ∪ fv(A)
(νx){x 7→ s} ≡ 0
(να)0 ≡ 0
!P ≡ P ‖ !P
{x 7→ s} ‖A ≡ {x 7→ s} ‖A{x 7→ s}
{x 7→ s} ≡ {x 7→ t} if s =E t
Figure 2: Structural equivalence
  EL is binary and holds on s, t iff M(s),M(t) and s, t have the same length.
The structural equivalence is the smallest equivalence relation on processes that is closed under
context application and that satisfies the relations of Figure 2. fn(P ) (resp. fv(P )) is the set of
names (resp. variables) that occur free in P . Bound names are renamed thus avoiding captures.
P{x 7→ s} is the process P in which free occurrences of x are replaced by s. An evaluation context
is a process C = (να)([·] ‖ P ) where P is a process. We write C[Q] for (να)(Q ‖ P ). A context
(resp. a process) C is closed when fv(C) = ∅ (there might be free names).
Possible evolutions of processes are captured by the relation →, which is the smallest relation,
compatible with the process algebra and such that:
(Com) c(x).P ‖ c(s).Q → {x 7→ s} ‖ P ‖Q
(Cond1) if Φ then P else Q → P if M |= Φ
(Cond2) if Φ then P else Q → Q if M 6|= Φ
∗
−→ is the smallest transitive relation on processes containing ≡ and −→ and closed by
application of contexts. We write P
c(t)
−−→ Q (resp. P
c(t)
−−→ Q) if there exists P ′ such that
P
∗
−→ c(x).P ′ and {x 7→ t}‖P ′
∗
−→ Q (resp. P
∗
−→ c(t).P ′ and P ′
∗
−→ Q).
Definition 5 The observational equivalence relation ∼o is the largest symmetric relation S on
closed extended processes such that ASB implies:
1. if, for some context C, term s and process A′,
A
∗
−→ C[c(s) ·A′] then for some context C ′, term s′ and process B′, B
∗
−→ C ′[c(s′) ·B′].
2. if A
∗
−→ A′ then, for some B′, B
∗
−→ B′ and A′SB′
3. C[A]SC[B] for all closed evaluation contexts C
Example 3.4 (Group signature) Group signature as defined in [6] can be modeled as observa-
tional equivalence as follows. Let P (x, i) be the protocol for signing message x with identity i. Let
P1 = c(y).P (pi1(y), pi1(pi2(y))) and P2 = c(y).P (pi1(y), pi2(pi2(y))). Intuitively, the adversary will
send < m,< i1, i2 >> where m is a message to be signed and i1, i2 are two identities. P1 signs m
with i1 while P2 signs m with i2. Then P preserves anonymity if P1 ∼o P2.
3.3 Simple processes
We do not need the full applied pi-calculus to symbolically represent CTMs. For example, CTMs
do not communicate directly: all communications are controlled by the attacker and there is
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no private channel. Thus we consider the fragment of simple processes built on basic processes.
Simple processes capture the usual fragment used for security protocols. A basic process represents
a session of a protocol role where a party waits for a message of a certain form and when all equality
tests succeed, outputs a message accordingly. Then the party waits for another message and so
on. The sets of basic processes B(i, n, x), where x is a variable sequence, i is a name, called pid,
standing for the process id and n is a name sequence (including for instance fresh and long-term
keys), are the least sets of processes such that 0 ∈ B(i, n, x) and
  If B ∈ B(i, n, x), s ∈ T (n, x), Φ is a conjunction of EQ and M atomic formulas such that
fn(Φ) ⊆ n and fv(Φ) ⊆ x, ⊥ is a special error message, then
if Φ ∧M(s) then cout(s) · B else cout(⊥) · 0 ∈ B(i, n, x).
Intuitively, if all tests are satisfied and if s is a well-formed message (no destructors, no
composed keys), the process sends a message depending on its inputs.
  if B ∈ B(i, n, x, x) and x /∈ x, then
cin(x). if EQ(pi1(x), i) then B else cout(⊥) · 0 ∈ B(i, n, x).
Intuitively, on input x, the basic process first checks that it is the expected recipient of the
message, before processing it.
cout and cin are two special names, representing resp. the send tape and the receive tape.
Example 3.5 The Wide Mouth Frog [19] is a simple protocol where a server transmits a session
key from an agent A to an agent B.
A→ S : A, {Na, B,Kab}Kas
S → B : {Nb, A,Kab}Kbs
A session of role A played by agent a can be modeled by the basic process
A(a, b)
def
= if true then cout(< a, {< na, < b, kab >>}
r
kas
>) · 0 else cout(⊥) · 0
Similarly a session of role S played for agents a, b can be modeled by
S(a, b)
def
= cin(x). if EQ(pi1(x), l) then
if pi1(pi2(x)) = a ∧ pi1(pi2(deckas(pi2(pi2(x))))) = b then
cout({< nb, < a, pi2(pi2(deckas(pi2(pi2(x))))) >>}
r
kbs
) · 0
else cout(⊥) · 0 else cout(⊥) · 0
A simple process is obtained by composing and replicating basic processes and frames, hiding
some names and all local variables:
(νn)[ (νx1, n1B1‖σ1)‖ · · · ‖(νxk , nkBk‖σk)‖
!(νy1, l1,m1cout(l1)B
′
1) ‖ · · · ‖ !(νyn, ln,mn.cout(ln)B
′
n) ]
where Bj ∈ B(ij , n]nj , xj), dom(σj) ⊆ xj , B′j ∈ B(lj , n]mj , yj). Note that each basic process
B′j first publishes its identifier lj , so that an attacker can communicate with it. Each process of
the form !((νyi, li)cout(li).B
′
i) is a replicated process.
In the definition of simple processes, we assume that for any subterm {t}vk occurring in a simple
process, v is a name that does not occur in any other term, and belongs to the set of restricted
names n. (Still, there may be several occurrences of {t}vk, unlike in [5]).
Example 3.6 Continuing Example 3.5, a simple process representing unbounded number of ses-
sions in which A plays a (with b) and s plays S (with a, b) for the Wide Mouth Frog protocol
is
ν(kas, kbs) ( !((νkab, na, r, l)cout(l).A(a, b))‖ !((νx, nb, r, l)cout(l).S(a, b)) )
For simplicity, we have only considered sessions with the same agent names a, b.
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if ∃x ∈ dom(σ)
s.t. xσ = s
or s ∈ N r nσ ` s
σ ` s1 . . . φ ` s`
f ∈ Σ
σ ` f(s1, . . . , s`)
σ ` s
M |= s = s′
σ ` s′
Figure 3: Deduction rules
σ `< {n2}
r2
n1
, {n3}
r3
n2
>
σ ` pi2(< {n2}
r2
n1
, {n3}
r3
n2
>)
σ ` {n3}
r3
n2
σ `< {n2}
r2
n1
, {n3}
r3
n2
>
σ ` pi1(< {n2}
r2
n1
, {n3}
r3
n2
>)
σ ` {n2}
r2
n1
σ ` {n1}
r1
k1
σ ` k1
σ ` dec({n1}
r1
k1
, k1)
σ ` n1
σ ` dec({n2}
r2
n1
, n1)
σ ` n2
σ ` dec({n3}
r3
n2
, n2)
σ ` n3
Figure 4: An example of formal proof
3.4 Deduction and static equivalence
At a particular point in time, while engaging in one or more sessions of one or more protocols,
an attacker may know a sequence of messages s1, . . . , s`. This means that he knows each message
but he also knows in which order he obtained the messages. So it is not enough for us to say
that the attacker knows the set of terms {s1, . . . , s`} since the information about the order is lost.
Furthermore, we should distinguish those names that the attacker knows from those that were
freshly generated by others and which are a priori secret from the attacker; both kinds of names
may appear in the terms.
As in the applied pi calculus [3], message sequences are recorded in frames φ = νn.σ, where n
is a finite set of names, and σ is a ground substitution. The variables enable references to each
sequence element. and we always assume that the terms si are ground. n stands for fresh names
that are a priori unknown to the attacker.
Deduction. Given a frame φ = νn.σ that represents the information available to an attacker,
a ground term s is deducible, which we write νn.(σ ` s) if σ ` s can be inferred using the rules
displayed in Figure 3.
Example 3.7 Consider the signature and equational theory of example 3.3.
Let φ = νn1, n2, n3, r1, r2, r3.σ with σ = {x1 7→ {n1}
r1
k1
, x2 7→< {n2}r2n1 , {n3}
r3
n2
>}. Then
νn1, n2, n3, r1, r2, r3.(σ ` n3). The full proof is displayed in figure 4.
Static equivalence. Deduction is not sufficient for expressing the attacker’s knowledge. We
have also to consider its distinguishing capabilities. Using the predicate symbols, we get the
following slight extension of static equivalence:
Definition 6 (static equivalence) Let φ be a frame, p be a predicate and s1, . . . , sk be terms.
We say that φ |= p(s1, . . . , sk) if there exists n such that φ = νn.σ, fn(si) ∩ n = ∅ for any 1 ≤ i ≤ k
and M |= p(s1, . . . , sk)σ. We say that two frames φ1 = νn.σ1 and φ2 = νn′.σ2 are statically
equivalent, and write φ1 ∼ φ2 when dom(φ1) = dom(φ2), and
∀s1, . . . , sk ∈ T (N ,X ), ∀p ∈ P . φ1 |= p(s1, . . . , sk) ⇔ φ2 |= p(s1, . . . , sk).
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If the only predicate is the equality predicate modulo the equational theory, we retrieve exactly
the definition of static equivalence [3].
Example 3.8 Consider (again for the theory of Example 3.3).
The two frames φ1 = νn1, r1, r2.{x 7→ {{k}r1n1}
r2
n1
} and φ2 = νn2, r3.{x 7→ {s}r3n2}. If s has the
same length as {k}r1n1 , then the two frames are statically equivalent, as there is no way to access
the term below the encryption with n1 (resp. n2).
It also sometimes convenient to forget the variable names in a frame, when they are irrelevant: if
L1 = (s11, . . . , s
1
m),L2 = (s
2
1, . . . , s
2
m) are two sequences of terms, νn1.L1 ∼ νn2.L2 if, by definition,
νn1 {x1 7→ s
1
1; . . . ;xn 7→ s
1
m} ∼ νn2 {x1 7→ s
2
1; . . . ;xn 7→ s
2
m}
We also sometimes confuse νn.(s1, . . . , sm) with the frame νn.{x1 7→ s1; . . . , xm 7→ sm}, for a
(fixed) given sequence of variables xi, i ∈ N.
4 Computational interpretation
4.1 Computational interpretation of terms and conditions
Given a security parameter η and a mapping τ from names to actual bitstrings of the appropriate
length, which depends on η, the computational interpretation [[s]]τη of a term s is defined as a
F-homomorphism: for each function symbol f there is a polynomially computable function [[f ]]
and [[f(t1, . . . , tn)]]
τ
η
def
= [[f ]]([[t1]]
τ
η , . . . , [[tn]]
τ
η).
In addition, for names, [[n]]τη
def
= τ(n). Such an interpretation must be compatible with the
equational theory: ∀s, t, η, τ. s =E t⇒ [[s]]τη = [[t]]
τ
η .
Similarly, each predicate symbol p gets a computational interpretation [[p]] as a PPT that
outputs a Boolean value. This is extended to conditions, using the standard interpretation of
logical connectives.
Given the structureM, which defines the symbolic interpretation of the predicates symbols,
Definition 7 [[p]] is an implementation of p ⊆ (T (N ))n, if, for every t1, . . . , tn ∈ T (N ), which
are in normal form,
Pr{(x1, . . . , xn)
R
←− [[t1, . . . , tn]]η : [[p]](x1, . . . , xn) = 1− b}
is negligible, where b = 1 if M |= p(t1, . . . , tn) and 0 otherwise.
We assume that, for every predicate symbol p, [[p]] is an implementation of p.
Example 4.1 Consider the predicate symbols of Example 3.3. Assume that the decryption and
projection functions return an error message ⊥ when they fail. Then here are possible interpreta-
tions of some predicates:
  [[M ]] is the set of bitstrings, which are distinct from ⊥. [[M ]] implements M if the encryption
scheme is confusion-free (a consequence of INT-CTXT [35]).
  [[EQ]] is the set of pairs of identical bitstrings, which are distinct from ⊥. It is an imple-
mentation of EQ as soon as [[M ]] implements M .
The interpretation of terms with variables also depends on the variable bindings: if σ is a
substitution (and assuming that there is no reminding free variables), [[t]]τ,ση is defined as [[tσ]]
τ
η .
Now, conditions are interpreted as expected:
[[Φ1 ∧ Φ2]]
τ,σ
η
def
= [[Φ1]]
τ,σ
η ∧ [[Φ2]]
τ,σ
η
and
[[p(s1, . . . , sn)]]
τ,σ
η
def
= [[p]]([[s1]]
τ,σ
η , . . . , [[sn]]
τ,σ
η ).
Finally, if L is a list of ground terms whose free names are in the domain of τ , [[νn.L]]τ
def
= [[L]]τ .
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4.2 Computational interpretation of basic processes
Given a basic processB ∈ B(i, n, x), a substitution σ whose domain is contained in x and codomain
does not contain free variable, a security parameter η and a binding τ for all free names occurring
in B, we define the (deterministic) machine [[B‖σ]]τη as follows. Irrelevant details are omitted and
(relevant information on the) configurations of the machine are written as triples [q, τ0, θ] where q
is the state of the machine and τ0, θ represent the (relevant part of) the working tape.
  The initial configuration of the machine is [B, τ0, [[σ]]
τ ]: the machine is in state B and its
working tape contains τ0, the restriction of τ to names and random symbols occurring in
B, and the binding for variables in x; [[{x1 7→ t1, . . . xn 7→ tn}]]
τ is, by definition, {x1 7→
[[t1]]
τ , . . . xn 7→ [[tn]]τ}. Note that τ0 includes the random input tape of the machine.
  [0, τ0, θ] is a final configuration: 0 is a final state
  If the machine is in a configuration
[cin(y). if EQ(pi1(y), i) then B1‖{x 7→ pi2(y)} else B2, τ0, σ]
then it may (only) perform a receive action (which will be triggered only when the attacker
schedules it, see Definition 3) then copies the content m of the reading tape on its working
tape, keeping thereof the binding for y in its memory, yielding a configuration
[if EQ(pi1(y), i) then B1‖{x 7→ pi2(y)} else B2, τ0, σ ] {y 7→ m}]
Next, the machine checks that m is a pair ([[i]]τ0 ,m1). If so, it moves to the configuration
[B1, τ0, σ ] {y 7→ m,x 7→ m1}]
Otherwise it moves to [B2, τ0, σ].
If x or y was bound in σ, the new bindings replace the former ones.
  If the machine is in configuration [if Φ then cout(< i, s >).B1 else B2, τ0, σ] it
first computes [[Φ]]τ0,ση . If some variables are unbound or if the evaluation result is not 1,
then it moves to [B2, τ0, σ], otherwise it computes [[s]]
τ,σ
η , writes it on the sending tape and
performs a send action (which will be triggered when the attacker schedules it). This yields
the configuration [B1, τ0, σ].
4.3 Computational interpretation of simple processes
Consider now a simple process
P ≡ (νn)[(νx1, n1.B1‖σ1)‖ · · · νxk , nk.Bk‖σk)‖
!(νy1, l1,m1.cout(l1).B
′
1)‖ · · ·!(νyn, ln,mn.cout(ln).B
′
n)]
such that Bi ∈ B(ji, n ∪ ni, xi) and dom(σi) ⊆ xi, B′i ∈ B(li, n ∪mi, yj).
Then, given a security parameter η, [[P ]]η is (the distribution of) an infinite family of CTMs,
obtained, for each sample τ of n, n1, . . . , nk,m1,λ, . . . ,mn,λ, l1,λ, . . . , ln,λ, λ ∈ N, (depending on
the security parameter η) by:
  interpreting each Bi‖σi by [[Bi‖σi]]τη
  interpreting each !(νyi, li,mi.cout(li).B
′
i) as an infinite network of machines Mi,λ = [[if x =
newi then cout(li,λ).B
′
i,λelse 0]]
τ
η , where each B
′
i,λ is obtained from B
′
i by renaming li in li,λ,
mi in mi,λ and yi in yi.λ, for λ ∈ N, where each of these machine has type i.
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5 Main result
In this section, we state our main result and give an outline of the proof. Fist, we start by stating
our assumptions.
5.1 Assumptions
As in [10, 29], we avoid the so-called commitment problem by requiring that honest keys are never
revealed. This hypothesis is implied by our notion of key hierarchy that is defined next.
Cryptographic assumptions Let us start with the assumptions on the encryption scheme: we
assume that it is IND-CPA (more precisely “type 3”-secure of [5]) and INT-CTXT, as defined in
[16]. In what follows, for randomized machines, we distinguish the input tape and the random
tape, by separatin the inputs with a |. For instance A(m | r) is the result of the computation of
A, on input m, with random input r.
Definition 8 A symmetric encryption scheme is IND-CPA, if, for any non-null polynomial P
with positive integer coefficients, for every PPT A with one oracle, there is a N such that, for all
η > N ,
|Pr{k
R
←− KG(η), r, r
R
←− U : AOk(0η | r) = 1}−
Pr{k
R
←− KG(η), r, r
R
←− U : AO
′
k(0η | r) = 1}| ≤
1
P (η)
where r is the sequence of random inputs r1, . . . , rn of the oracles, Ok is the oracle, which, on re-
quest x, returns E(x, k | ri) and O′k is the oracle which, on request x, returns
E(0l(x), k | ri).
Definition 9 ([16]) A symmetric encryption scheme is INT-CTXT if, for any non-null polyno-
mial P with positive integer coefficients, for every PPT A with one oracle, there is a N such that,
for all η > N ,
Pr{k
R
←− KG(η), r, r
R
←− U : ∃x, r′.AOk(0η | r) = {x}r
′
k ∧ x /∈ S} ≤
1
P (η)
where S = {x1, . . . , xn} is the sequence of requests to the oracle, Ok(xi) = {xi}
ri
k and r is the
sequence (r1, . . . , rn).
Adversary’s key generation. We assume the adversary only uses correctly generated keys.
The parties are supposed to check that the keys they are using have been properly generated.
The assumption could be achieved by assuming that keys are provided by a trusted server that
properly generates keys together with a certificate. Then when a party receives a key, it would
check that it comes with a valid certificate, guaranteeing that the key has been issued by the
server. Of course, the adversary could obtain from the server as many valid keys as he wants.
However, this assumption is rather strong compared to usual implementation of symmetric
keys. It is however necessary to deal with natural examples of protocols like the following one.
A sends out a message of the form {c}Kab where c is a constant. Note that c could also be a
ciphertext. This can be formally represented by the process
A = (νr)cout(< c, {c}
r
kab
>).0
B expects a key y and a message of the form {{b}y}Kab where b is the identity of B, in which
case, it sends out a secret (or goes in a bad state). This can be formally modeled by the process
B = cin(z). if EQ(b, dec(dec(pi2(z), kab), pi1(z)) then cout(s) else 0
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Then symbolically, the process (νkab)(νs)A‖B would never emit s. However, a computational
adversary can forge a key k such that any bitstring can be successfully decrypted to b using k.
In particular, at the computational level, we have dec(c, k) = b. Thus by sending < k, {c}rkab >
to B, the adversary would obtain the secret s. This is due to the fact that security of encryption
schemes only provide guarantees on properly generated keys.
We do not know how this counter-example is handled in[10] and [29].
Key hierarchy We say that a term u is a plaintext subterm of t if it is a subterm of t such
that at least one occurrence of u in t is not at a key or a randomness position. More formally,
the set pst(t) of plaintext subterms of t is defined as follows: pst(a) = {a} if a is a name, a
constant or a variable, pst(< t1, t2 >) = pst(t1) ∪ pst(t2) and pst({u}rv) = pst(u). For example,
pst(< k1, {{a}
r2
k2
}r1k1 >) = {a, k1}.
We say that k encrypts k′ in a set of terms S if S contains a subterm of the form {u}rk such
that k′ is a plaintext subterm of u. There is a key cycle in S if there exist k1, . . . , kn such that
ki+1 encrypts ki for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 and k1 encrypts kn.
We require a hierarchy on keys to prevent key cycles. To define an order on keys, we need
some convention on the renaming of names in processes. This renaming occurs in particular when
a process is replicated: !((νn)P )→ (νn)P‖!((νn)P ). We will assume by convention that the name
n is successively renamed in n1, n2, n3, . . .
More formally, let
P = (νn[B1‖σ1‖ · · · ‖Bk‖σk‖S1‖ · · · ‖Sn])
be a simple process where the Bi are basic processes and Si =!((νkSi)S
′
i) are replicated processes.
We assume by renaming that all names occurring in P (bounded or free) are distinct. Let K =
⋃n
i=1 k
Si be the set of bounded names occuring under a replication andN be the set of all remaining
names of P that are not in K. The set of extended names of P is N ∪ {ki | k ∈ K, i ∈ N}. By
convention, we assume that each time a replicated process Si is duplicated: Si → (νkSi)S′i‖Si,
the process (νkSi)S′i is renamed in (νk
Si,p)S′i[k
Si
j 7→ k
Si,p
j ] where p is the least integer that has
not been used yet for renaming the names of kSi .
We say that v visibly occurs in u if u = v or u =< u1, u2 > and v visibly occurs in u1 or u2. We
say that a key is immediately revealed if it is (visibly) disclosed before being used. More formally,
Definition 10 A key k is immediately revealed in a simple process
P = (νn[B1‖σ1‖ · · · ‖Bk‖σk‖S1‖ · · · ‖Sn])
if, whenever cout(s) occurs in some Bi or Si with k occurring in s, that it Bi or Si is of the form
B = C[cout(s).B
′] for some context C then k visibly occurs in s or there is a term u such that k
visibly occurs in u and cout(u) occurs before in B, that is, C = C
′[cout(u).C
′′[ ]] for some contexts
C ′, C ′′.
Immediately revealed keys typically correspond to keys of corrupted parties. If k ∈ K is immedi-
ately revealed then we also say that ki is immediately revealed for any i ∈ N.
The extended honest names of P are the extended names of P which are not immediately
revealed.
Definition 11 We say that a simple process P admits a key hierarchy if there exists an strict
ordering < on the extended honest names of P such that, for any extended honest names k, k ′,
whenever k encrypts k′ in the image of σ, for some closed evaluation context C, for some process
Q such that C[P ]
∗
−→ Q and such that νn.σ is a frame of Q, then k′ < k. We say that νn.σ
observes the key hierarchy <.
It is easy to see that if there exists a key hierarchy, no key cycle can be created. Moreover,
if there exists a key hierarchy then no (extended) honest keys can be learned by the adversary.
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Indeed, if an honest key k were learned by the adversary, he would be able to forge {k}k and thus
to contradict the key hierarchy property.
Compared to [29], our hypothesis on keys is more general. In [29], the order is imposed by
the order in which keys are generated and a key k cannot encrypt keys generated before k. If a
protocol satisfies the hypothesis of [29], it also admits a key hierarchy for our definition.
Compared to [10], our hypothesis is more flexible since we do not impose a fixed order. However,
the two hypotheses are incomparable. In [10], he order is imposed by the order in which keys are
used for encrypting: if k1 is used for encrypting before k2 is used for encrypting than k1 > k2.
(Actually, they require k1 < k2 but they conversely impose that whenever k encrypts k
′ then
k < k′.) This definition allows that the order on the keys depends on the execution of the
protocol.
Consider the protocol P1 informally described as follows.
B → A : N
A→ B : {N,K1,K2}Kab , {N,K2,K1}Kab
B → A : {K1}K2
Then P1 satisfies the requirement of [10], even if, once A has sent {N,K1,K2}Kab , {N,K2,K1}Kab ,
the adversary can choose to obtain {K1}K2 or {K2}K1 . (Note that he cannot obtain both.) The
protocol P1 does not admit a key hierarchy with our definition.
Consider now the protocol P2 informally described as follows.
A→ B : {N,K1,K2}kab , {N}K1
B → A : {K1}K2
Then P2 does not satisfy the requirement of [10] while it does admit a key hierarchy by requiring
N < K1 < K2.
Parsing To ease parsing operations, we assume that the pairing, key generation and encryption
functions add a typing tag (which can be changed by the attacker), which includes which key
is used in case of encryption. This can be easily achieved by assuming that a symmetric key k
consists of two parts (k1, k2), k1 being generated by some standard key generation algorithm and
k2 selected at random. Then one encrypts with k1 and tags the ciphertext with k2.
5.2 Main theorem
We are now ready to state our main theorem: observational equivalence implies indistinguishabil-
ity.
Theorem 12 Let P1 and P2 be two simple processes such that each Pi admits a key hierarchy.
Assume that the encryption scheme is joint IND-CPA and INT-CTXT. Then P1 ∼o P2 implies
that [[P1]] ≈ [[P2]].
For example, anonymity of group signature as defined in section 2 is soundly abstracted by the
property defined in Example 3.4. Computational secrecy as defined in section 2 can be soundly
abstracted by strong secrecy: a secret x is strongly secret in P if P (s) ∼o P (s′) for any term s, s′.
Note however that strong secrecy implies computational secrecy but might be too strong since
in the computational games corresponding to strong secrecy, the secret values are given to the
adversary before it starts interacting with the protocol while these values are given at the end of
the interaction in the definition of computational secrecy.
5.3 Overview of the proof
The rest of the paper is devoted to the proof of Theorem 12.
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A first approach Let us first show why the naive ideas do not work. Assume we have proved
that any computational trace is an interpretation (for some sample input) of a symbolic trace.
Assume moreover that we have a soundness result showing that, if s1, . . . , sn and u1, . . . , un are
two equivalent sequences of terms, then the distributions [[s1, . . . , sn]] and [[u1, . . . , un]] are indis-
tinguishable. Assume finally that the traces of P1 and the traces of P2 can be pairwise associated
in statically equivalent traces (as a consequence of observational equivalence).
One could think that it is possible to conclude, pretending that [[P2]] ≈ [[P1]] since [[t1]] ≈ [[t2]]
for each trace t1 of P1 and the corresponding trace t2 of P2. This is however incorrect. Indeed,
an attacker can choose his requests (hence the trace) depending on the sample input. In the
equivalence [[t1]] ≈ [[t2]], we use an average on the samples, while the choice of t1 (and t2), may
depend on this sample: there is a circular dependency.
To be more concrete, here is a toy example. Assume that an attacker, given a random input
τ , first gets [[s]]τ (in both experiments) and then, schedules his requests depending on the ith bit
of [[s]]τ : at the ith step, he will get tji (resp. u
j
i in the second experiment), where j is the ith bit
of [[s]]τ . Assume that, for any sequence of bits j1, . . . , jn,
[[s, tj11 , . . . , t
jn
n ]] ≈ [[s, u
j1
1 , . . . , u
jn
n ]]
but that, for the particular sample τ such that [[s]]τ = j1 · · · jn, the attacker outputs 1 on input
[[s, tj11 , . . . , t
jn
n ]]
τ and outputs 0 on input [[s, uj11 , . . . , u
jn
n ]]
τ . This may happen as the distributions
could be indistinguishable while distinguished on one particular sample value. Note that, in the
distribution equivalence, we draw again a sample, while the choice of j1, ..., jn depended precisely
of that sample. Then the attacker always outputs 1 in the first experiment since he precisely chose
from τ the sequence j1, ...jn. Similarly, he always outputs 0 in the second experiment: he gets a
significant advantage, distinguishing the two processes.
The example shows that we cannot simply use the soundness of static equivalence on traces.
The idea is to consider trees labeled with terms, instead of sequences of terms. Then we do not
commit first to a particular trace (as choosing j1, ..., jn above). Considering such trees requires
an extension of the results of Abadi and Rogaway, which are proved for sequences of terms.
Actually standard security definitions such as IND-CPA, IND-CCA, can be recasted as an
interaction of the attacker with a tree of possible oracle calls. The tree structure reflects the
adaptivity of the attacker. If we look carefully, in [5], the proof does not use the adaptivity of the
attacker. Indeed, from a term sequence, all oracle calls are known beforehand and the simulator
does not need to adapt his oracle calls to the replies.
Proof sketch We associate a tree TP with each process P , which we call process computation tree
and define symbolic and computational equivalences (denoted respectively ∼ and ≈) on process
computation trees (see the definitions in the section 6). Such trees record the possible behaviors
of the symbolic process, depending on (non-deterministic) choices of the symbolic attacker. We
use process computation trees as an intermediate step and show the following implications:
P ∼o Q⇒ TP ∼ TQ ⇒ TP ≈ TQ ⇒ [[P ]] ≈ [[Q]]
P ∼o Q⇒ TP ∼ TQ : (Lemma 15) It holds for any term algebra, relying however on the particular
fragment of process algebra (simple processes). This is similar to the classical characteriza-
tion of observational equivalence as labeled bisimilarity.
TP ∼ TQ ⇒ TP ≈ TQ : (Lemma 19) It uses the (tree) soundness in the ground case. This is a new
concept, which generalizes the soundness of static equivalence from sequences to trees. It is
necessary for the preservation of trace equivalences.
TP ≈ TQ ⇒ [[P ]] ≈ [[Q]] (Lemma 25) It uses trace lifting: we need to prove that a computational
trace is, with an overwhelming probability, an instance of a symbolic trace.
The two last implications are proved here in the context of pairing and symmetric encryption
only. However, we believe that the use of computation trees and the way we get rid of encryption,
can be extended to other primitives.
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6 Computation Trees
Previous results on proving soundness of symbolic models hold either for static equivalences [15]
or for relating symbolic and computational traces [24]. However, combining soundness of static
equivalence with trace lifting is not sufficient for relating observational equivalence with indis-
tinguishability. Instead of defining the static equivalence on frames (related to only one, linear,
execution trace), we move to an equivalence on trees, which records execution traces.
6.1 General Computation Trees
Let S = T (N ) be a set of labels, typically a pair < i, u > of a pid and a term for a request u to
the process i, or a request to start a new process.
If L1,L2 are two sequences of terms νn1.L1 ⊆ νn2.L2 if, by definition,
  n1 ⊆ n2
  ∃L, L2 = L1 · L (L2 is obtained from L1 by appending a list of terms)
  (n2 \ n1) ∩ fn(L1) = ∅: newly restricted names are also newly introduced.
We also write t ∈ νn.L if t is a member of the list L.
Definition 13 A computation tree T is a mapping from a prefix closed subset of S∗ (Pos(T ), the
positions of T ) to pairs (P, φ) where P is a simple process and φ = νn.L is a ground frame over
T (N ). If p ∈ Pos(T ) and T (p) = (P, φ), we write φ(T, p) the frame φ. Moreover T must satisfy
the following conditions:
  for every positions p, q, if p > q, then φ(T, q) ⊆ φ(T, p)
  for every position p · t, t ∈ φ(T, p · t)
  for every positions p ·t, p ·u, if t =E u, then t = u. This ensures that there is no two branches
labeled with the same (equivalent) message.
The trees need not to be finite: they may be both infinitely branching and contain infinite paths.
Finally, positions need not to be closed lexicographically.
The definition of static equivalence ∼ is extended to computation trees. T |p is the sub-tree of
T at position p.
Definition 14 ∼ is the largest equivalence relation on computation trees such that if T1 ∼ T2,
then φ(T1, ) ∼ φ(T2, ) and there is an one-to-one mapping β from T (N ) to itself such that, for
any length 1 position t of T1, T1|t ∼ T2|β(t).
Typically, requests sent by the adversary need not to be identical, but must be equivalent.
Then β is a mapping, which depends on T1, T2, which associates the messages in the labels of T1
with equivalent messages labeling T2.
6.2 Process computation trees
We organize all possible symbolic executions of a simple process P in a tree TP . Each node of TP
is labeled by (Q,φ) where Q is the current state of the process and φ represents the sequence of
messages sent over the network by P so far.
Let P ≡ νn, νx. Q1‖σ1‖ · · · ‖QN‖σN‖S be a simple process where S = S1‖ · · · ‖Sk is the
composition of a finite number of replicated processes Si and every Qi ∈ B(li, ni, xi) is either 0 or
a basic process cin(xi).Pi and σi is a ground substitution whose domain contains only free variables
of Pi. Note that li is the pid of Qi. The process computation tree TP is defined as follows. The
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labeling and positions are defined by induction on the position length: TP() = (P , id) where id
denotes the empty frame, and, for any p ∈ Pos(TP), let
TP(p) = (νnνx. Q
p
1‖σ
p
1‖ · · · ‖Q
p
N‖σ
p
N‖S , νn
′.L)
where each Qpj is either 0 or cin(x
p
j ).P
p
j . Then q = p · α ∈ Pos(TP) if α =< li, u >, Q
p
i 6≡ 0,
νn′σ ` α and
Qpi
cin(α)
−−−→
cout(α1)···cout(αm)
−−−−−−−−−−−→ Qqi ‖σ
p
i ‖{x
p
i 7→ α}
in which case
TP(p · α) = (νnνx.Q
q
1‖σ
q
1‖ · · · ‖Q
q
N‖σ
q
N , νn
′. L · (α, α1, . . . , αm))
where, for every j 6= i, Qqj = Q
p
j , σ
q
j = σ
p
j , Q
q
i is either 0 or cin(x
q
i ).P (x
q
i ) and σ
q
i = σ
p
i ◦ {x
p
i 7→ α}.
This corresponds to the case where an attacker sends a message to an active process Q of pid li.
The attacker may also ask for the initialization of a process. S = S1‖ · · · ‖Sk and there is a fixed
ordering on the Sj (which correspond to the roles of the protocol). Then q = p · newj ∈ Pos(TP),
where newj is a special constant (1 ≤ j ≤ k). Let Sj =!(νy, l, nj cout(l).B). Then
TP(p · newj) = (νnνxνyνlνnj . Q
p
1‖σ
p
1‖ · · · ‖Q
p
N‖σ
p
N‖B‖S , νn
′νnj . L · l)
assuming by renaming that the names of y, nj do not appear free in Q
p
1‖σ
p
1‖ · · · ‖Q
p
N‖σ
p
N . Note
that by construction, B ∈ B(l, nj ∪n, yj) thus l is the identifier of B. l is first published such that
the intruder can use it to schedule B.
A process computation tree is a computation tree. Observational equivalence yields equivalence
between the corresponding process computation trees:
Lemma 15 Let P and Q be two simple processes. If P ∼o Q then TP ∼ TQ.
This does not follow directly from [3] since we slightly changed the process algebra, adding
predicates. Moreover, the tree equivalence does not correspond exactly to labeled bisimilarity.
Actually, we only prove an implication here (which is all we need).
Proof : Assume that TP 6∼ TQ and let us construct a process, which distinguishes between P
and Q. We construct by induction on the length of p ∈ Pos(TP ) a family of one-to-one and onto
functions (from T (N )/ =E to itself) βp such that
  if βp is defined, then, for any q < p, βq is defined. We define then (inductively) B by
B(p · α) = B(p) · βp(α).
  if βp is defined, then, for any q ≤ p, φ(TP , q) ∼ φ(TQ, B(q))
  either φ(TP , p) 6∼ φ(TQ, B(p)), in which case βq is undefined for q ≥ p,
  or βq is defined for any q < p and φ(TP , p) ∼ φ(TQ, B(p)), in which case βp is defined and
TP |p 6∼ TQ|B(p) implies that, for some α, TP |p·α 6∼ TQ|B(p·α).
If β is defined on any strict prefix of p and TP |p ∼ TQ|B(p), we simply use the definition of
∼: there is a one-to-one and onto function βp such that, for every p · α ∈ Pos(TP ), TP |p·α ∼
TQ|B(p)·βp(α).
If β is defined on any strict prefix of p and TP |p 6∼ TQ|B(p) and φ(TP , p) ∼ φ(TQ, B(p)), then
we define βp as follows: for every α, if p · α ∈ Pos(TP ), then let φ(TP , p) = νn1.σ
p
1 . By definition
of TP , σ
p
1 ` α, therefore there is a term tα such that fn(tα) ∩ n1 = ∅ and M |= tασ
p
1 = α. If
φ(TQ, B(p)) = νn2.σ
p
2 , then we let βp(α) = tασ
p
2 . Let us show that βp thus defined is one-to-one
on T (N )/ =E , hence can be extended to a one-to-one mapping. If βp(α) = βp(α′), then there are
terms t, u such thatM |= tσp2 = uσ
p
2 andM |= tσ1 = α∧uσ1 = α
′. Since φ(TP , p) ∼ φ(TQ, B(p)),
M |= tσ2 = uσ2 implies M |= tσ1 = uσ1, henceM |= α = α′.
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This completes the construction of the family βp.
Since TP 6∼ TQ, there must be a minimal position p for which βp is undefined, otherwise the
family βp yields an equivalence relation R satisfying the conditions of definition 14, hence TP ∼ TQ
since ∼ is the largest equivalence relation satisfying these conditions.
Let p = p1 · α, p2 = B(p1).
α cannot be a constant newj since, in that case, νn1.L1 = φ(TP , p1) ∼ φ(TQ, p2) = νn2.L2
implies φ(TP , p1 · newj) = νn′1.L1 · l1 ∼ νn
′
2.L2 · l2 = φ(TQ, p2 · newj).
Then let
  TP (p1) = νn1.P1, νn′1. L1
  TQ(p2) = νn2.P2, νn′2. L2
  φ1 = νn′1. L1 ∼ νn
′
2. L2 = φ2.
  P1 = (νn1νx)Q1‖θ11‖ · · · ‖QN‖θ
1
N‖S1 where Qi ≡ c(xi).Q
′
i
  Q′i
cin(α)
−−−→
cout(α1),...cout(αm)
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ Q′′i ‖θ
1
i ‖{xi 7→ α}
  φ(TP , p1 · α) = νn′1. L1 · (α, α1, . . . , αm).
  P2 = (νn2νx2)R1‖θ21‖ · · · ‖RN‖θ
2
N‖S2 where Rj = cin(yj).R
′
j
  R′j
cin(βp1(α))−−−−−−−→
cout(α
′
1),...,cout(α
′
m′
)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ R′′j where R
′′
j is 0 or ready to receive a message.
We first construct a process Ip1 with free variables y = {y1, . . . , yM}, where M is the length
of the list L1 (which is also the length of L2), such that
Ip1‖(νn
′
1 L1)‖P1
∗
−→ c(a).I1
while, for any I2,
Ip1‖(νn
′
2. L2)‖P2 6
∗
−→ c(a).I2
Since φ(TP , p1 · α) 6∼ φ(TQ, p2 · βp1(α)), either m 6= m
′, in which case we may assume w.l.o.g
that m > m′ (possibly exchanging the roles of the processes) and we construct a process
Ip1 ≡ νx.cin(tα) · cout(x1). · · · cout(xm).c(a) · 0
such that fn(Ip1) ∩ n
′
1 = ∅ (following fn(tα) ∩ n
′
1 = ∅). Then
Ip1‖(νn
′
1. L1)‖P1
∗
−→ c(a).I1,
while the process reaches a deadlock before being able to emit on c, when combined with P2.
In case m = m′, there are terms u1, . . . , un s.t. fn(ui) ∩ (n′1 ∪ n
′
2) = ∅ and a predicate
symbol p such that σ1 |= p(u1, . . . , un) while σ2 6|= p(u1, . . . , un) (or the converse), if we let
σ1, σ2 be the canonical substitutions associated respectively with the lists L1 · (α, α1, . . . , αm) and
L2 · (β(α), α′1, . . . , α
′
m).
We construct a process Ip1 , which constructs tα as above, receives the m messages and then
distinguishes the two processes using an appropriate test using the predicate p:
Ip1 ≡ νx.cin(tα) · cout(x1) · · · cout(xm) · if p(u1, . . . , un) then c(a) · 0 else 0
Now that we have dinstinguished the processes (and frames) at position p1, p2, we have recon-
struct, moving up along the paths p1, p2, a process which distinguishes the labels of the nodes,
until we reach the root of the trees, thus distinguishing P and Q.
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For every prefix q of p1, let
TP (q) = ((νn1,qνx1,q) P1,q, νn′1,q . L1,q) and TQ(q) = ((νn2,qνx2,q) P2,q , νn
′
2,q. L2,q).
We construct, by induction on |p1| − |q|, a context Iq , which distinguishes between
((νn1,qνx1,q) P1,q)‖(νn′1,q . L1,q) and ((νn2,qνx2,q) P2,q)‖(νn
′
2,q. L2,q).
Ip1 is the process, which we constructed above.
Let q · α be a length n + 1 prefix of p. Assume L1,q·α = L1,q · (α, α1, . . . , αm), L2,q·α =
L2,q · (βq(α), α′1, . . . , α
′
m) and let σ
q
1 , σ
q
2 be the two substitutions associated with L1,q and L2,q
respectively. There is a term tα such that fn(tα) ∩ (n′1,q ∪ n
′
2,q) = ∅ andM |= tασ
q
1 = α ∧ tασ
q
2 =
βq(α). Iq will then be the process defined by:
Iq ≡ cin(tα) · cout(y1) · · · cout(ym) · Iq·α
Then, for every i = 1, 2,
Iq‖((νni,qνxi,q)Pi,q)‖(νn′i,q . Li,q)
∗
−→ Iq·α‖((νni,q·ανxi,q·α) Pi,q·α)‖(νn′i,q·α. Li,q·α)
And therefore, we conclude by the induction hypothesis.
Finally, applying the result when q = , we get a process I, which distinguishes between P
and Q.

6.3 Scheduled computation trees
When all behaviors of a concrete attacker are instances of behaviors of a symbolic attacker, the
concrete attacker can be seen as a machine which schedules the behavior of the symbolic attacker.
That is what we try to capture here.
We assume that, given a security parameter η and a mapping τ from names to actual bitstrings,
there is a parsing function κτη that maps bitstring to their symbolic representation. This parsing
function is assumed to be total, using possibly constants or new names of the appropriate length.
In the case of symmetric encryption, we exhibit (in the proof of Lemma 19) such a parsing function,
computable in polynomial time.
For any symbolic computation tree T , and random tape τ , we let OT,τ be an oracle, whose
replies depend on the tree T and the sample τ . Initially, the tree T is a process computation tree.
Then the oracle can be simply understood as simulating the network and answering to attacker’s
messages. This is convenient for an intuitive understanding of OT,τ , but we will transform the
tree T later on. That is why we need a general definition.
Intuitively, the tree specifies how the oracle can be adaptively queried and what are its answers.
This is formalized as follows.
When queried with mn, after being queried successively with m1, . . . ,mn−1,
  the oracle first computes κτη(mn). Let rj = κ
τ
η(mj) for 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
  the oracle returns 0 if r1 · · · rn is not a position of T
  otherwise, let φ1 = νn1σ1 = φ(T, r1 · · · rn−1), φ2 = νn2σ2 = φ(T, r1 · · · rn) be the labels of
the two successive nodes of T . For any name k that occurs in σ2 and not in σ1, the oracle
draws a random number τ(k) using its random tape τ . If k /∈ n2 then the oracle returns
τ(k) (the value is public in that case).
Next, the oracle returns [[xσ2]]
τ for all x ∈ dom(σ2) \ dom(σ1). Intuitively, the oracle replies
by sending back the (interpretation of the) terms labeling the target node of the tree that
have not been already given.
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In the last case, the oracle answer corresponds, in case T is a process computation tree, to the
messages sent by the process answering the attacker’s message.
Definition 16 Given two symbolic computation trees T1, T2, the two trees are computationally
indistinguishable, which we write T1 ≈ T2 if, for any PPT A,
|Pr{τ, r : AOT1,τ (0η | r) = 1} −Pr{τ, r : AOT2,τ (0η | r) = 1}|
is negligible.
7 Main steps of the proof
From now on, we fix the signature Σ0, the equations E0 and the predicate set P0, defined in
Example 3.3 and in the following examples of Section 3.2.
The set of equations in E0 can be turned in a convergent term rewriting system: we let t ↓ be
the unique normal form of t with respect to this rewrite system.
7.1 Getting rid of encryption
To prove indistinguishability of processes, we replace ciphertexts by encryption of zeros. We follow
the key hierarchy, starting from a maximal key. The function Ψk on trees replaces terms under
encryption by constants 0l of the same length:
Ψk(n) = n if n is a name or a constant
Ψk(< t1, t2 >) = < Ψk(t1),Ψk(t2) >
Ψk({t}rk) = {0
l(t)}rk
Ψk({t}rk′) = {Ψk(t)}
r
k′ if k 6= k
′
Note that Ψk is an injective mapping on terms, essentialy because we assumed that two random
components r of encryptions are distinct as soon as the corresponding plaintext are distinct (this
correspond to two distinct calls to the encryption algorithm, which draws a random input r each
time it is called).
Then Ψk is extended to computation trees by applying Ψk on the requests and frames. Intu-
itively, the underlying process remains the same but the adversary is given a view of the execution
where any encryption by k has been replaced by an encryption of zeros by k.
If k is not deducible, then an intruder cannot tell whether the encryptions by the key k have
been replaced by encryptions of zeros:
Lemma 17 For any computation tree T and for any name k such that k is not deducible from
any frame labeling a node of T , then T ∼ Ψk(T ).
Proof : β is chosen to be Ψk. It is a one-to-one function on labels, since Ψk is one-to-one. It
remains to show that for any frame ψ such that ψ 6` k, we have ψ ∼ Ψk(ψ). For any context C,
C[t1, . . . , tn] ↓ [{u}
r
k 7→ {0
l(u)}rk] = C[t1, . . . , tn][{u}
r
k 7→ {0
l(u)}rk] ↓ by induction on the length of a
rewrite sequence to the normal form. Moreover, the predicates M,EQ,EL,Psamekey are stable by
replacement of zeros under encryption: M |= P (t1, t2)[{u}rk 7→ {0
l(u)}rk] ⇔ P (t1, t2) This yields
the desired property. 
Now, once every encryption has been replaced by encryption of zeros then static equivalence
coincides with equality up-to name renaming:
Lemma 18 Let φ1 and φ2 be two frames such that for any subterm of φ1 or φ2 of the form {u}rk,
we have u = 0l for some l ∈ N. If Psamekey is in the set of predicates, then φ1 ∼ φ2 iff φ1 and φ2
are equal up-to name renaming.
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Proof : Only the direction “only if” needs a proof. Assume νn1σ1 ∼ νn2σ2. Let the size of
σ = {x1 7→ t1, . . . , xn 7→ tn} be the sum of the sizes of the terms ti. The size of a term is 1 when it
is a constant (or a name) and, if t = f(t1, . . . , tn), then the size of t is |t| = 1+ |t1|+ · · ·+ |tn|. We
reason by induction on the size of σ1. When σ1 is empty then σ2 must be empty too. Now if, for
some x, u, v, xσ1 =< u1, v1 >, then, since M |= M(pi1(xσ1)), φ1 ∼ φ2 implies M |= M(pi1(xσ2)),
hence xσ2 is a pair < u2, v2 >. If we let φ
′
i = νni.σ
′
i be the frame defined by x1σ
′
i = ui, x2σ
′
1 = vi,
yσ′i = yσi if y ∈ dom(σi)\{x} and whose domain is (dom(σi)\{x})]{x1, x2}, we have φ
′
1 ∼ φ
′
2: for
every term t, tσ′i = (t{x1 7→ pi1(x), x2 7→ pi2(x)})σi. Then we can apply the induction hypothesis
and conclude. Now, we can assume that no variable in either frame is mapped to a pair. This
means that, for every variable x, xσi is either a ciphertext, a name, or a constant.
If, for some x, xσ1 is a constant c, thenM, φ1 |= EQ(x, c), henceM, φ2 |= EQ(x, c): xσ2 = c.
Then simply remove x from the domains of the two frames and apply the induction hypothesis.
If, for some x, y, x 6= y, xσ1 = yσ1, then M, φ1 |= EQ(x, y), hence M, φ2 |= EQ(x, y) and
therefore xσ2 = yσ2. Then simply remove x from the domain of σi and apply the induction
hypothesis. From now on, we may assume that xσi 6= yσi as soon as x 6= y.
If, for some variable x, xσ1 is a name k1, then xσ2 must be a name k2; this can be checked
in several ways.For instance, if it was a ciphertext then Psamekey(xσ2, xσ2) would hold, while it
would not be true for xσ1. Consider then all variables whose image in σ1 is an encryption with k1:
by renumbering we may assume it is x1, . . . , xm. xiσ1 = {u1i }
r1i
k1
. M, φ1 |= M(dec(xi, x)), hence
M, φ2 |= M(dec(xi, x)): there are terms such that xiσ2 = {u2i }
r2i
k2
. Then replacing σj with σ
′
j such
that x′iσj = u
j
i and replacing xi with x
′
i, we have φ
′
1 ∼ φ
′
2 since tσ
′
i = (t{x
′
1 7→ dec(x1, x), . . . , x
′
m 7→
dec(xm, x)})σi.
If k1 occurs only once in σ1 (in this case m = 0), we simply remove x from the domains of σ1
and σ2: by induction hypothesis, the resulting frames are identical, up to renaming. Then adding
k1 7→ k2 = xσ2 to this renaming, we get a renaming of σ1 into σ2.
Now, assume k1 occurs more than once. We can apply the induction hypothesis to φ
′
1, φ
′
2: these
two frames are identical, up to a renaming ρ. In particular, we must have k1ρ = k2. In addition,
by consistency of random numbers and since all variable images are distinct, the names r11 , . . . , r
1
m
and r21 , . . . , r
2
m occur only once in their respective frames. Let ρ
′ = ρ ] {r11 7→ r
2
1 , . . . , r
1
m 7→ r
2
m}.
ρ′ is a renaming of φ1 into φ2.
Finally consider the case where, for every x, xσ1 is a ciphertext. Similarly, xσ2 must be a
ciphertext (we can apply the above reasoning switching φ1 and φ2). Let k1 be a key occurring in
σ1 (there must be at least one). As above, let x1, . . . , xm be the variables such that xiσ1 = {u1i }
r1i
k1
.
Now, let x1σ2 = {u21}
r21
k2
. M, φ1 |= Psamekey(x1, xi) for every i = 2, . . . ,m. It follows that M, φ2 |=
Psamekey(x1, xi) for i = 2, ...,m. This implies that xiσ2 = {u2i }
r2i
k2
for some r2i , u
2
i . Now, all symbols
rji must occur only once, by consistency of the random numbers and since any ciphertext occurs at
most once in each frame. In addition, since φ1, φ2 satisfy the same EL predicates, for every i, the
length of u1i equals the length of u
2
i . On the other hand, we assumed that only terms 0
l have been
encrypted. It follows that u1i = u
2
i for every i. Now, if we consider the frames φ
′
1, φ
′
2 obtained by
removing x1, . . . , xm from the domain of σ1, σ2, there is no longer any occurrence of k1, k2, r
1
i , r
2
i
in φ′1, φ
′
2. By induction hypothesis, there is a renaming ρ such that ρ(φ
′
1) = φ
′
2. Then, extending
ρ with {k1 7→ k2, r11 7→ r
2
1 , . . . r
1
m 7→ r
2
m}, we get a renaming of φ1 in φ2.

7.2 Soundness of static equivalence on trees
Static equivalence on process trees can be transferred at a computational level.
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Lemma 19 Let P1 and P2 be two simple processes such that each Pi admits a key hierarchy.
Let TPi be the process computation tree associated to Pi. If TP1 ∼ TP2 then TP1 ≈ TP2 or the
encryption scheme is not joint IND-CPA and INT-CTXT.
This key lemma is proved by applying the functions Ψk following the key ordering, to the
trees TPi . We preserve equivalence on trees thanks to Lemma 17. If we find a key k such that
Ψk(TPi) 6≈ TPi , then we can construct an attacker who breaks IND-CPA. Otherwise we are left to
trees labeled with frames whose only subterms of the form {u}rk are such that u = 0
l for some l.
In this case, we show that equivalence of such frames coincides with equality using Lemma 18.
Proof :
Assume there exists a PPT A that distinguishes TP1 from TP2 with non negligible probability.
A makes at most a polynomial number of queries of the form (j, new). Thus a polynomial number
n1 (resp. n2) of keys can be generated when A is interacting with TP1 (resp. TP2).
Moreover, when A interacts with TPi , it only makes requests up to a certain depth p(η) where
p is a polynomial. Let TP /n denote the tree obtained from TP by removing nodes at depth greater
than n. Due to our convention about the renaming of keys when processes are duplicated (see
section 5.1), we have that TP1/p(η) (resp. TP2/p(η)) contains at most n1 (resp. n2) distinct keys.
Let <i be the key ordering of Pi for i ∈ {1, 2} and let k1i , . . . , k
ni
i be the names of Pi such that
k1i <i k
2
i <i · · · <i k
ni
i . Let T
1
i = TPi and T
j+1
i = Ψkj
i
(T ji ) for 1 ≤ j ≤ nj . By Lemma 17, we
have T j+1i ∼ T
j
i . By transitivity of ∼, we deduce T
n1
1 ∼ T
n2
2 . Then either A distinguishes T
n1
1
from Tn22 or A distinguishes T
j+1
i from T
j
i for some i, j with non negligible probability.
We first consider the case where A distinguishes T j+1i from T
j
i for some i, j with non negligible
probability. We show that we can break IND-CPA or INT-CTXT for the key kji . W.l.o.g, we
assume i = 1. We construct a PPT B that simulates the oracle O
T
j
1
in polynomial time. Initially
B knows the process P1 and generates all the keys k
1
1 , . . . , k
ni
1 by itself except k
j
1. Then, each time
A queries w where w is a bitstring then B computes the symbolic representation u of w as follows:
  Either w is the interpretation of newj , and then the computation result is newj
  Or w is a pair w1‖w2, in which case B computes the symbolic representation of w1 and w2.
  Or w is an encryption with some key k. If B has already seen w then B already knows
its symbolic interpretation. Otherwise, B decrypts w by using its own key if k 6= kj1 or by
submitting w to the INT-CTXT oracle. If the decryption fails, B creates three new names
u, k0, r and remembers the association between w and its symbolic representation {k}rk0 .
Otherwise, the decryption yields to a bitstring w′ for which B computes a symbolic repre-
sentation u. Then B creates a new name r and associate to w the symbolic representation
{u}rk.
  Or w is a key. There are two cases, either B has already seen w in which case B already
knows its symbolic interpretation or B creates a new name u and remembers the association
between w and its symbolic representation u.
  Otherwise, we are left to the case where w does not start with the pair tag neither with the
cyphertext tag or the key tag. There are two cases, either B has already seen w in which
case B already knows its symbolic interpretation or B creates a new name u and remembers
the association between w and its symbolic representation u.
Note that parsing performed by B has the following property (bottom-up parsing):
if u is a subterm of κτη(m), then κ
τ
η([[u]]
τ
η) = u. (P)
Once B has computed the symbolic representation u of w, B looks up at the symbolic repre-
sentation P of the current state of the process and computes the next state Q that is reached:
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P
cin(u)
−−−→
cout(u1)···cout(um)
−−−−−−−−−−−→ Q. It remains to B to give the computational counterpart of u1, . . . , um.
B first identifies the maximal subterms of ui for which it already knows the computational coun-
terpart. Then the computational counterpart of u1, . . . , um is computed by pairing and encrypting
as follows: for each subterm of the form {v}rk:
  If k <1 k
j
i , then B encrypts [[v]] with k yielding to a ciphertext c and remembers the
association between c and {v}rk. Note that v cannot contain k as plaintext subterm due to
the key hierarchy.
  If k >1 k
j
i , then B encrypts 0
l(v) with k yielding to a ciphertext c and remembers the
association between c and {v}rk.
  If k = kji then B submits to IND-CPA oracle the request 0
l(v), [[v]] and gets a ciphertext c.
Again, B remembers the association between c and {v}rk.
When A halts outputting b then B halts outputting b. Then A
O
T
j
i behaves like B
O
k
j
1 and A
O
T
j+1
i
behaves like B
O
′
k
j
1 , except when B submits an encryption to the INT-CTXT oracle. We deduce
that B breaks the joint INT-CTXT and IND-CPA game.
We are left to the case where A distinguishes T n11 from T
n2
2 with non negligible probability. Let
β1 be the one-to-one function from T
n1
1 to T
n2
2 and β2 be the one-to-one function from T
n2
2 to T
n1
1 .
For any position p of T n11 not greater than p(η), the frame of T
n1
1 (p) is equivalent to the frame
Tn22 (β1(p)). From Lemma 18, we deduce that the two frames are equal modulo name renaming.
Since the frames contain the adversary requests at the same position, it implies that β1 is the
identity (modulo name renaming). Symmetrically β2 is the identity thus we deduce that T
n1
1 and
Tn22 are identical up-to renaming and up-to depth p(η). Thus they are a fortiori indistinguishable
by A. 
7.3 Relating concrete and symbolic traces
We need here to show that concrete traces are, with overwhelming probability, interpretations of
symbolic ones.
We let P be a simple process, τ be a sample of names and F be the family of CTMs obtained
by interpreting P , with respect to the sample τ (which we write by abuse of notations [[P ]]τη). We
define what it means for a concrete execution to be fully abstracted by a path in a process tree.
First, given P , η, τ, A, the behavior of the network [[P ]]τη‖A is deterministic.
We let Messages(P , η, τ, A) be the sequence defined as follows: let γAn be the sequence of
configurations of A (along its deterministic computation), on the sample input τ , when interacting
with [[P ]]τη . Let δ
A
n be the subsequence of γ
A
n of configurations following a new, send or receive action.
  If δAn follows a new action, let j be the content of the scheduling tape in δ
A
n and l be the
content of the receiving tape in the same configuration. We let then an = s(newj) · r(l).
  If δAn follows a send action of A, we let an = s(< i,m >) where i is the content of the
scheduling tape of A in configuration δAn and m is the content of the sending tape in δ
A
n .
  If δAn follows a receive action, then an = r(m) where m is the content of the receiving tape
in δAn .
Messages(P , η, τ, A) is the sequence an obtained in this way.
Lemma 20 We may assume w.l.o.g. (by changing the adversary) that Messages(P , η, τ, A) is
a sequence s(m1) · R1 · s(m2) · R2 · · · · s(mn) · Rn where every Ri is a sequence of messages
r(m′1) · · · r(m
′
ni
). In other words, after a modification of the scheduling tape, there cannot be
a receive event before a send event has been completed.
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In such a situation, Messages(P , η, τ, A) can be more conveniently represented as a sequence
L1
m1−−→ L2 · · ·
mn−−→ Ln where Li is the increasing sequence of messages: Li+1 = Li ·Ri ·mi. We
also denote the sequence of messages sent by A by SMessages(P , η, τ, A) = (m1, . . . ,mn . . .).
As for process computation trees, we will also insert in the sequence the configurations of the
network in order to keep a stronger invariant relating the symbolic processes and their implemen-
tations along the computation. If
P = νn, ∀x.P1‖ · · · ‖Pn‖S1‖ · · · ‖Sk,
where P1, . . . , Pn are basic processes, possibly with substitutions, and S1, . . . , Sk are replicated
processes, γ([[Pi]]
τ ) is the corresponding configuration [q, τi, σ] of the machine, as defined in sec-
tion 4.
The configuration γ of the network is then given (besides the configuration of A) by the
sequence γ([[Pi]]
τ ) for i = 1, ..., n (replicated processes do not play any role as long as there is no
process activation; when a process is activated, it moves out of the scope of the bang).
Now the computation of the A‖[[P ]]τ can be split as follows:
γ1, L1
m1−−→ γ2, L2 · · ·
mn−−→ γn, Ln
If T is a process computation tree and p ∈ Pos(T ), p abstracts such a computation sequence
if p = α1 · · ·αn and, for every j ≤ n, [[αj ]]τ = mj and, if T (α1 · · ·αj) = (Qj , φj) (= (Qj , νnj . Lj))
then [[φj ]]
τ (= [[Lj ]]τ ) = Lj and [[Qj ]]τ = γj .
Furthermore, p fully abstracts the computation if γn corresponds to a final configuration. (In
which case, we succeeded in lifting the concrete trace to a symbolic one).
In other words, p fully abstracts a computation sequence if it defines a symbolic trace whose
interpretation is that computation sequence.
The following characterizes situations in which computations cannot be fully abstracted:
Lemma 21 Let P be a simple process and TP its process computation tree. Given a sample τ and
an attacker A, we let Γ be the computation sequence of A‖[[P ]]τ .
There is a path p in Pos(TP) such that one of the following holds:
1. p fully abstracts Γ
2. or else TP(p) = (Q,φ), there is a a transition γn−1, Ln−1
m
−→ γn, Ln in Γ such that [[φ]]τ =
Ln−1 and there is a message m1, which is polynomially computable from Ln−1, which is
neither a pair, nor an encryption with a known key and such that φ 6` κτη(m1).
3. or else there is a subterm v of φ ∪ {κτη(m)} and a name k such that dec(v, k) is in normal
form, while D([[v]]τη , τ(k)) 6=⊥.
4. Or else there is a name k occurring in P and a term u occurring as a subterm in
κτη(SMessages(P , η, τA)) such that τ(k) = [[u]]
τ
η and k 6= u.
5. Or else there is a term {v}rk occurring as a subterm in κ
τ
η(SMessages(P , η, τ, A)) and a term
{v}r
′
k such that [[{v}
r
k]]
τ
η = [[{v}
r′
k ]]
τ
η .
The proof relies on a number of simplification lemmas for conditions, whose proofs are given
in appendix A and which we state below.
Lemma 22 Every condition Φ is (effectively) logically equivalent to a conjunction of atomic for-
mulas
  M(s1), . . .M(sn) such that, for every i, si does not contain any pairing or encryption symbol
and does not contain any subterm dec(k, u) where k is a name
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  EQ(t1, u1), . . . EQ(tm, um) such that, for every j = 1, ...n there is a term C not containing
any decryption or projection symbol and there are indexes i, i1, . . . , ik such that {tj , uj} =
{si, C[si1 , . . . , sik ]}.
Lemma 23 If s is a term in normal form and M(s) is a simplified condition (as in lemma 22)
and θ is a substitution such that, for every variable x, M |= M(xθ), then, for every subterm v of
sθ ↓, if one of the following holds:
  v = dec(w, k) for some w, k, and M |= M(w),
  v = pii(w) for some w and M |= M(w),
then there is a variable x such that w is a subterm of xθ
Proof : (Of lemma 21)
Let Γ be the computation sequence
γ1, L1
m1−−→ γ2, L2 · · ·
mn−−→ γn, Ln
For simplicity, we assume that there is no message newj in the sequence of messages: these steps
cannot have any influence on the trace extensibility. We first show that, if ∀j ≤ n− 1,
  TP(κ
τ
η(m1) · · ·κ
τ
η(mj)) = (Qj , φj),
  [[φj ]] = Lj , [[Qj ]] = γj and φj ` κτη(mj+1),
  Qj ≡ Rj‖σj and σj = {x1 7→ κτη(m1), . . . xn−1 7→ κ
τ
η(mn−1)}
then TP(κ
τ
η(m1) · · ·κ
τ
η(mn)) = (Qn, φn) with [[Qn]] = γn, [[φn]] = Ln and Qn = Rn‖σn and
σn = σn−1 ] {xn 7→ κτη(mn)} For, let p = κ
τ
η(m1) · · ·κ
τ
η(mn−1),
  TP(p) = (Qn−1, Ln−1) and Qn−1 ≡ Q‖cin(xi).Pi‖σn−1,
  in configuration γn−1, the machine Mi, whose pid is the interpretation of Pi’s pid, is in state
[cin(xi) · Pi, τi, [[θi]]
τ ], where θi is the restriction of σn−1 to the variables of its domain that
occur free in Pi.
  Pi = if Φ then cout(s) · Q else cout(⊥) · 0 (all tests can be gathered together in a single con-
dition, without loss of generality)
or else Pi = cin(x
′
i) · P
′
i
In the last case, our claim follows trivially. So, we discard this case in the following.
Let θ be θi ]{xi 7→ κτη(mn)}. By hypothesis, for any variable x in the domain of θ, φn−1 ` xθ.
Since Γ is a computation sequence, [[Φ]]τ,θ = 1.
If M(s) is an atomic formula occurring in Φ and M, θ 6|= M(s), then there is a subterm w of
sθ ↓ whose head symbol is a projection or a decryption symbol. Assume first that w = dec(v, k)
is a minimal subterm of sθ ↓ headed with a projection or a decryption. Since [[M(s)]]τ,θ = 1,
D([[v]]τη , τ(k)) 6=⊥.
Moreover, v must be a subterm of some xθ by lemma 23, and we fall in case 3. The case
w = pii(v) is not possible as we must have pii([[v]]
τ
η) 6=⊥ (see the assumption on the computational
interpretation of pairing, at the beginning of section 4).
Now, if EQ(s, t) is an atomic formula occurring in Φ and M, θ 6|= EQ(s, t), while M, θ |=
M(s)∧M(t), by lemma 22, either s or t only contains decryption symbols, projections and names
and sinceM, θ |= M(s)∧M(t), sθ ↓ or tθ ↓ is a subterm of some xθ by lemma 23. It follows that
either sθ ↓ or tθ ↓ is a subterm of φ ∪ {κτη(m)}.
Consider for instance that it is sθ ↓. Moreover, [[sθ ↓]]τ = [[tθ ↓]]τ by hypothesis and therefore,
by (P ): sθ ↓= κτη([[sθ ↓]]
τ
η) = κ
τ
η([[tθ ↓]]). Now, by lemma 22, t = C[s1, . . . , sk] where C does
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not contain the symbols dec, pi1, pi2 and s1, . . . , sk only contain decryption, projections, names and
variables.
We prove by induction on C that, if [[tθ]]τη is equal to a some [[u]]
τ
η where u is a subterm of some
xθ and tθ 6= u, then we fall in either case 3 or 4 or case 5 of the lemma.
If C is empty, then, by lemma 23, tθ ↓ is a subterm of some xθ, which is not possible, since, in
that case, thanks to property (P ), tθ ↓= κτη([[tθ]]
τ
η) = κ
τ
η([[u]]
τ
η) = u.
If t is a name k1, then we fall in case 4 of the lemma.
If t is a pair, then u must be a pair and we use the induction hypothesis: one of the direct
subterms of tθ is distinct from the corresponding subterm of u, while their interpretations are
identical.
Now, if t = {t1}
r1
k1
, u cannot be a pair. If it is a name, then we fall in case 3 of the lemma.
If it is a ciphertext u = {u1}
r2
k2
, either k1 6= k2 and we fall again in case 3 of the lemma or else
k1 = k2. In this latter case, either t1 6= u1 and we apply the induction hypothesis, or else t1 = u1
and we fall in the case 5 of the lemma.
Now, to complete the proof of our preliminary statement, if we are not in case 3 or case 4,
M, θ |= Φ, since Φ is a conjunction of atomic formulas of the forms M(s) or EQ(s, t). This can
be iterated if Q itself is a conditional statement (we omit the details here). Then
Qn−1
cin(κ
τ
η(mn))
−−−−−−−→
cout(s1),...,cout(sq)
−−−−−−−−−−−→ Qn
and, if we let φn = νkn.Ln, φn−1 = νkn−1.Ln−1, Ln = Ln−1 · (κτη(mn), s1, . . . , sq), there is indeed
a position p′ = m1 · · ·mn in TP such that TP(p′) = (Qn, φn) with the desired properties.
Now, we have completed the proof of our preliminary statement. Then, either there is a
path p such that TP(p) = (Q,φ) and there is a transition γn−1, Ln−1
m
−→ γn, Ln in Γ such that
[[φ]]τη = Ln−1 and φ 6` κ
τ
η(m), or else, from the preliminary statement, we can construct, by
induction on the length of Γ, a path p which fully abstracts Γ.
In case κτη(mn) is not deducible, by induction on its size, we construct m, constructable in
polynomial time from mn and such that m is not a pair or an encryption with a known key: in
either of the latter cases, we can project or decrypt, getting a smaller term.

Concrete traces can be lifted to symbolic ones with overwhelming probability:
Lemma 24 Assume that the encryption scheme is INT-CTXT and IND-CPA. Let P be a simple
process that admits a key ordering and TP be its process computation tree. Let A be a concrete
attacker. The probability over all samples τ , that there is a path p in TP fully abstracting the
computation sequence of A‖[[P ]]τ is overwhelming.
To prove this lemma, we first simplify the trees by applying the functions Ψk thanks to Lemmas 19
and 17. Then, using the lemma 21, in each case, in which a trace cannot be fully abstracted, we
break either INT-CTXT or IND-CPA.
Proof : From an attacker A, we construct a machine B, which is a scheduler of the tree TP
(or, more precisely, the tree in TP in which all symbolic traces that have no concrete instances,
are removed). B behaves as A, except that he gets his answer from the oracle OTP ,τ . Moreover,
if there is no successor in TP corresponding to A’s request (the trace cannot be lifted any more),
then we assume that the oracle OTP ,τ sends an error message which depends on the reason of the
failure (φ is defined as in lemma 21):
  (guessed ciphertext,m1) if a component of the request m is a message m1 such that
κτη(m1) = {w}
r
k, and φ 6` {w}
r
k, φ 6` k or κ
τ
η(m1) = k, and φ 6` k.
  (confusion, [[v]]τη) if there is a subterm v of φ ∪ {κ
τ
η(m)} such that dec(v, k) is in normal
form and D([[v]]τη , τ(k)) 6=⊥.
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  (collision1, [[u]]τη) if u is a term in κ
τ
η(SMessages(P , η, τ, A)) and a name k occurring in P
such that τ(k) = [[u]]τη and k 6= u.
  (collision2,m), if κτη(m) = {v}
r
k occurs as a subterm of κ
τ
η(SMessages(P , η, τ, A)) and
there is a term {v}r
′
k , r 6= r
′ such that m = [[{v}r
′
k ]]
τ
η
  other otherwise
In further transformations of the machine and the tree, the above properties might no longer
be satisfied. That is why, in addition, upon receiving any of these error messages, B checks the
corresponding message: in case of (guessed ciphertext,m1), it checks that m1 /∈ [[φ]]η . If it is
indeed the case, it stops outputting 1. Otherwise, it outputs 0. In case of (confusion,m), it checks
that there is a subterm v of φ∪{κτη(m)} and a name k such that [[v]]
τ
η = m and D(m, τ(k)) 6=⊥. If
it is the case, the machine outputs 1, otherwise it outputs 0. In case of (collision1,m), again B
checks the condition and outputs 1 if it is satisfied, otherwise it outputs 0. In case of collision2,
there is no possible verification and B simply outputs 1. All these verifications can be performed
in polynomial time.
Otherwise, on any fully abstract trace, B stops outputting 0.
 = Pr{τ, r : BOTP ,τ (0η | r) = 1}
is the probability that, given a sample τ , the corresponding concrete trace Γ cannot be fully
abstracted.
From lemma 21, the above failure cases are the only possible ones. Therefore there is a name
k (chosen from P (η) possible names) such that for some i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}:
Pr{τ, r : B
OTP ,τ
i,k (0
η | r) = 1} >

4× P (η)
where B1,k (resp. B2,k, resp. B3,k, resp. B4,k) is the machine, which behaves as B, except
that it outputs 1 only in case of guessed ciphertext (resp. only in case of confusion, resp.
only in case of collision1, resp. only in case collision2).
Now, let T0 be the tree obtained by applying Ψk1 · · ·Ψkn to TP , as in the proof of lemma 19.
Note that the oracle may not reply the same error message when the adversary is interacting with
T and with Ψk(T ): first it may be the case that on one tree there is an error message and not
in the other. Next, the final verifications may succeed in one case and not in the other, as for
instance m may no longer belong to Ψk(φ); this was the purpose of the verification phase.
As in the proof of lemma 19, either we break joint INT-CTXT and IND-CPA or else, for some
i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and some key k,
Pr{τ, r : B
OT0,τ
i,k (0
η | r) = 1} >

4× P (η)2
Let us construct, in each case, a machine which breaks joint INT-CTXT and IND-CPA.
The machine Ci,k behaves as Bi,k, but first draws all names except k, and, instead of querying
the oracle OT k
0
,τ , it performs several computations (as in the proof of lemma 19: first parse
the request of Bi,k possibly stopping if INT-CTXT is broken. Then retrieve from the process
component what is the (symbolic) expected reply s1, . . . , sr. Then compute ti = Ψk1 . . .Ψkm(si).
These terms do not contain any occurrence of k, except in expressions {0α}rk. Then compute
[[t1, . . . , tr]]
τ , by computing all messages which do not contain k, using the sampled keys and
querying the encryption oracle for each encryption with k, which the attacker does not already
have.
Finally, we distinguish between the three cases:
1. i = 1: if B1,k outputs 1, then there is two cases.
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  Either it got at the last stage a message m from which it can extract m1 such that
m1 = [[{w}rk]]
τ
η and {w}
r
k is not deducible from Ψk1 · · ·Ψkm(φ). In that case, since we
applied all the functions Ψki , {w}
r
k cannot occur as a subterm in Ψk1 · · ·Ψkm(φ) thus
[[w]]τη has never been sent as a query to the encryption oracle. So, C1,k simply submits
m1 to the INT-CTXT oracle.
  Or it got at the last stage a messagem from which it can extractm1 such thatm1 = [[k]]
τ
η
and k is not deducible from Ψk1 · · ·Ψkm(φ). Then C1,k builds an encrypted message
m2 = [[{0α}rk]]
τ
η using the key m1 = [[k]]
τ
η and submits m2 to the INT-CTXT oracle.
2. i = 2: if B2,k outputs 1, we break “confusion freeness”, hence INT-CTXT (see [35]).
3. i = 3: Either the term u can be deduced from κτη(SMessages(P , η, τ, A)), in which case the
attacker can guess τ(k) and break INT-CTXT, or else u is encrypted with k. But in that
case [[u]]τη = τ(k) must be 0
α, a case which cannot occur with probability 4×P (η)2 .
4. i = 4: the machine C4,k queries the IND-CPA encryption oracle with 1
α, checks the equality
with the term at hand [[{0α}rk]]
τ
η . In case of equality, he deduces that he must be talking with
the oracle encrypting always 0α. The guess is correct if [[{0α}rk]] = [[{0
α}r
′
k ]], and only in this
case, since we cannot have [[{1α}rk]] = [[{0
α}r
′
k ]] because of the determinacy of decryption.
This occurs with probability at least 4×P (η)2 , when r, r
′ are chosen randomly: we break
IND-CPA.

7.4 Concluding the proof of the main theorem
In the last lemma, we simply apply the previous result. Since traces can be lifted, an attacker on
the concrete processes is actually a scheduler of the computation trees, hence distinguishing the
concrete processes amounts to distinguish the corresponding computation trees.
Lemma 25 Let P1 and P2 be two simple processes admitting a key hierarchy. Let TPi be the
process computation tree associated to Pi. If the encryption scheme is joint IND-CPA and INT-
CTXT, then TP1 ≈ TP2 implies that [[P1]] ≈ [[P2]].
Proof : If A is a CTM, which distinguishes between [[P1]]η and [[P2]]η, let
 = |Pr{τ, r : A‖[[P1]]
τ
η(0
η | r) = 1} −Pr{τ, r : A‖[[P2]]
τ
η(0
η | r) = 1}|
From lemma 24, for every i ∈ {1, 2}, the probability (over τ, r) that there is a path p in TPi
fully abstracting the computation sequence Γiτ of A‖[[Pi]]
τ
η is overwhelming. By definition, if p
fully abstracts Γiτ , then A behaves as a scheduler of TPi on this sample input:
Pr{τ, r : A
OTPi
,τ (0η | r) = 1} −Pr{τ, r : A‖[[Pi]]
τ
η(0
η | r) = 1}
is negligible.
It follows that
|Pr{τ, r : A
OTP1
,τ (0η | r) = 1} −Pr{τ, r : A
OTP2
,τ (0η | r) = 1}|+ ν1 + ν2 ≥ 
where ν1, ν2 are negligible.
Then, if TP1 ≈ TP2 ,  is also negligible. 
Theorem 12 is now a straightforward consequence of Lemma 15, 19 and 25.
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8 Future work
First, there are several possible extensions. Following our proof scheme, we believe that our results
can be extended to other security primitives, e.g. public-key encryption or signatures.
There are harder extensions. For instance, can we drop the requirement that private keys are
not dynamically disclosed? As explained in [10], there is a commitment problem if we rely on a
simulator. We could also extend our results to a wider class of equational theories by extending
in particular Lemma 19.
Another possible extension is to allow the attacker to generate encryption keys, which are then
not necessarily obtained through the key generation algorithm. Currently, we assumed that the
adversary gets keys, upon requesting corrupted users. As explained in section 5.1, this is a non
trivial question, which may require an extension of the symbolic model.
Finally, our results could be extended to a wider class of processes, for instance allowing a
non-trivial else branch in the conditionals. Such extensions may be not very hard.
Besides extensions of the result, we also wish to apply it to actual protocols, for instance voting
protocols, getting computational security guarantees.
We also wish to investigate proofs of simulatability/universal composability, relying on our
abstraction of indistinguishability.
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Rules for M :
M(< u, v >) → M(u) ∧M(v)
M({u}rk) → M(u) ∧M(k) ∧M(r)
M(s) → > if s ∈ N
M(s[pii({u}rw)]) → ⊥
M(s[pii(k)]) → ⊥ if k ∈ N
M(s[dec(< u, v >,w)]) → ⊥
M(s[dec(u,< v, w >)]) → ⊥
M(s[dec(u, {v}rw)]) → ⊥
M(s[dec(k, u)]) → ⊥ if k is a name
M(s[dec({u}rv, w)]) → ⊥ if v, w ∈ N and v 6= w
M(s[dec({u}yx, z)]) → M(s[u]) ∧M(x) ∧M(y) ∧M(z) ∧EQ(x, z)
Rules for EQ:
EQ(< u1, v1 >,< u2, v2 >) → EQ(u1, u2) ∧ EQ(v1, v2)
EQ(< u1, v1 >, {u2}rv2) → ⊥
EQ(< u1, v1 >, k) → ⊥ if k ∈ N
EQ({u1}r1v1 , {u2}
r2
v2
) → EQ(u1, u2) ∧ EQ(v1, v2) ∧ EQ(r1, r2)
EQ({u1}r1v1 , k) → ⊥ if k ∈ N
EQ(x, x) → M(x)
EQ(s, t) → ⊥ if M(s)
∗
−→ ⊥ or M(t)
∗
−→ ⊥
EQ(s[dec({u}yx, z)], t) → EQ(s[u], t) ∧ EQ(x, z)
EQ(t, s[dec({u}yx, z)]) → EQ(t, s[u]) ∧ EQ(x, z)
Figure 5: Simplification of atomic formulas
A Simplifying the atomic formulas
A.1 Proof of lemma 22
Lemma 22. Every condition Φ is (effectively) logically equivalent to a conjunction of atomic
formulas
  M(s1), . . .M(sn) such that, for every i, si does not contain any pairing or encryption symbol
and does not contain any subterm dec(k, u) where k is a name
  EQ(t1, u1), . . . EQ(tm, um) such that, for every j = 1, ...n there is a term C not containing
any decryption or projection symbol and there are indexes i, i1, . . . , ik such that {tj , uj} =
{si, C[si1 , . . . , sik ]}.
Proof : First, we may assume w.l.o.g. that for all atomic formulas M(s) or EQ(s, t), s, t are in
normal form (replacing a term with its normal form does not change the models). Next, for every
formula EQ(s, t) we add the atomic formulas M(s) and M(t). We use then the transformation
rules displayed in figure 5. The rules terminate (the multiset of sizes of arguments of predicate
symbols is strictly decreasing at each step). They are correct: M satisfies a left side iff it satisfies
a right side. Finally, the normal forms satisfy the conclusion of the lemma:
  Each time a destructor (a symbol from dec, pi1, pi2) is applied to a non-variable term, which
is not headed itself by a destructor, there is at least one applicable rule. This is explicitly
stated by pattern matching for the M predicate and covered by the 3 last rules for the EQ
predicate symbol.
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  M cannot be applied to a term headed with a constructor (thanks to the first 3 rules)
  EQ cannot be applied to two terms headed with constructors (thanks to the first rules of
EQ)

In what follows, we assume this simplified version of conditions.
A.2 A useful lemma
Lemma 23. If s is a term in normal form and M(s) is a simplified condition (as in lemma 22)
and θ is a substitution such that, for every variable x, M |= M(xθ), then, for every subterm v of
sθ ↓, if one of the following holds:
  v = dec(w, k) for some w, k, and M |= M(w),
  v = pii(w) for some w and M |= M(w),
then there is a variable x such that w is a subterm of xθ.
Proof : We rely on normal forms of conditions (lemma 22). We prove the property for any term
t such that sθ
∗
−→ t, by induction on the length of the reduction sequence.
If there is no reduction step, let v = dec(w, k) (resp. v = pii(w)) be a subterm of sθ. Since
M |= M(w) and by lemma 22, w must be a subterm of some xθ.
Now, assume the property true for t and that t −→ t′. Any subterm t′|p = dec(w, k) (resp.
pii(w)) of t
′ is either a subterm of t, or else we are in one of the following cases:
  t|p = dec(dec({w}rk′ , k
′), k)
  t|p = dec(w, dec({k}rk′ , k
′))
  t|p = dec(pi1(< w,w′ >), k)
  t|p = dec(pi2(< w′, w >), k)
  t|p = dec(w, pi1(< k,w′ >))
  t|p = dec(w, pi2(< w′, k >))
In all cases, we can apply the induction hypothesis, for instance consider the two first cases: In
the first case, by induction hypothesis {w}kk′ is a subterm of some xθ, hence w is a subterm of xθ.
In the second case, w is a subterm of xθ by induction hypothesis.

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